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Abstract
We construct the first constant-round zero-knowledge classical argument for NP secure against
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1 Introduction
Zero-knowledge protocols allow to prove statements without revealing anything but the mere fact that
they are true. Since their introduction by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89] they have had a
profound impact on modern cryptography and theoretical computer science at large. Following more
than three decades of exploration, zero-knowledge protocols are now quite well understood in terms of
their expressiveness and round complexity. In particular, under standard computational assumptions,
arbitrary NP statements can be proved in only a constant number of rounds [GMW86, GK96a].
In this work, we consider classical zero-knowledge protocols with post-quantum security, namely,
protocols that can be executed by classical parties, but where both soundness and zero-knowledge are
guaranteed even against efficient quantum adversaries. Here our understanding is far more restricted than
in the classical setting. Indeed, not only are we faced with stronger adversaries, but also have to deal with
the fact that quantum information behaves in a fundamentally different way than classical information,
which summons new challenges in the design of zero-knowledge protocols.
In his seminal work [Wat09], Watrous developed a new quantum simulation technique and used
it to show that classical zero-knowledge protocols for NP, such as the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson 3-
coloring protocol [GMW86], are also zero knowledge against quantum verifiers, assuming commitments
with post-quantum hiding. These protocols are, in fact, proof systems meaning that soundness holds
against unbounded adversarial provers, let alone efficient quantum ones. As in the classical setting, to
guarantee a negligible soundness error (the gold standard in cryptography) these protocols require a
polynomial number of rounds.
Watrous’ techniques do not apply for classical constant-round protocols. In fact, constant-round
zero-knowledge protocols with post-quantum security remains an open question, even when the honest
parties and communication are allowed to be quantum. The gap between classical and quantum zero
knowledge stems from fundamental aspects of quantum information such as the no-cloning theorem
[WZ82] and quantum state disturbance [FP96]. These pose a substantial barrier for classical zero-
knowledge simulation techniques, a barrier that has so far been circumvented only in specific settings
(such as, [Wat09]). Overcoming these barriers in the context of constant-round zero-knowledge seems
to require a new set of techniques.
1.1 Results
Under standard computational assumptions, we resolve the above open question — we construct a
classical, post-quantumly secure, computational-zero-knowledge argument for NP in a constant number
of rounds (with a negligible soundness error). That is, the honest verifier and prover (given a witness)
are efficient classical algorithms. In terms of security, both zero-knowledge and soundness hold against
arbitrary polynomial-size non-uniform quantum circuits.
Our construction is based on fully-homomorphic encryption supporting the evaluation of quantum
circuits (QFHE) as well as additional standard classical cryptographic primitives. All are required to
be secure against efficient quantum algorithms with non-uniform quantum advice. QFHE was recently
constructed [Mah18a, Bra18] based on the assumption that the Learning with Errors Problem [Reg09]
is hard for the above class of algorithms (from hereon, called QLWE) and a circular security assumption
(analogous to the assumptions required for multi-key FHE in the classical setting). All other required
primitives can be based on the QLWE assumption.1
Theorem 1.1 (informal). Assuming QLWE and QFHE, there exist a classical, post-quantumly secure,
computational-zero-knowledge argument in a constant number of rounds for any L ∈ NP.
1We note that cryptographic hardness assumptions against algorithms with quantum advice are considered quite often,
QLWE included (see for instance [Wat09, BJSW16, BCM+18]).
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Based on our techniques, we also construct (under the same assumptions) a fully-simulatable coin-
flipping protocol, which combined with the work of Broadbent et al. [BJSW16], yields constant-round
zero-knowledge arguments for QMAwith quantum honest parties.
Corollary 1.1 (informal). Assuming QLWE and QFHE, there exist a quantum, post-quantumly secure,
computational-zero-knowledge argument in a constant number of rounds for any L ∈ QMA.
Main Technical Contribution: Non-Black-Box Quantum Extraction. Our main technical contribu-
tion is a new technique for extracting information from quantum circuits in a constant number of rounds.
The technique circumvents the quantum information barriers previously mentioned. A key feature that
enables this is using the adversary’s circuit representation in a non-black-box manner.
The technique, in particular, yields a constant round extractable commitment. In such a commitment
protocol, the verifier can commit to a classical (polynomially long) string. This commitment is statistically
binding and hiding against efficient quantum receivers. Furthermore, it guarantees the existence of a
simulator, which given non-black-box access to the sender’s code, can simulate its view while extracting
the committed plaintext. Further details are given in the technical overview below.
1.2 Technical Overview
We next discuss the main challenges in the design of post-quantum zero knowledge in constant rounds,
and our main technical ideas toward overcoming these challenges.
1.2.1 Classical Protocols and the Post-Quantum Barrier
To understand the challenges behind post-quantum zero knowledge, let us first recall how classical
constant-round protocols work, and identify why they fail in the quantum setting. Classical constant-
round protocols typically involve three main steps: (1) a prover commitment α to a set of bits, (2) a
verifier challenge β, and (3) a prover response γ, in which it opens the commitments corresponding to the
challenge β. For instance, in the 3-coloring protocol of [GMW86], the prover commits to the (randomly
permuted) vertex colors, the verifier picks some challenge edge, and the prover opens the commitments
corresponding to the vertices of that edge. To guarantee a negligible soundness error, this is repeated in
parallel a polynomial number of times.
As describe so far, the protocol satisfies a rather weak zero-knowledge guarantee — a simulator can
efficiently simulate the verifier’s view in the protocol if it knows the verifier’s challenge β ahead of time.
To obtain an actual zero-knowledge protocol, we need to exhibit a simulator for any malicious verifier,
including ones who may arbitrarily choose their challenge depending on the prover’s message α. For
this purpose, an initial step (0) is added where the verifier commits ahead of time to its challenge, later
opening it in step (2) [GK96a].
The added step allows the simulator to obtain the verifier’s challenges ahead of time by means of
rewinding. Specifically, having obtained the verifier commitment, the simulator takes a snapshot of the
verifier’s state and then runs it twice: first it generates a bogus prover commitment, and obtains the
verifier challenge, then with the challenges at hand, it returns to the snapshot (effectively rewinding the
verifier) and runs the verifier again to generate the simulated execution. The binding of the verifier’s
commitment guarantees that it will never use a different challenge, and thus simulation succeeds.
Barriers to Post-Quantum Security. By appropriately instantiating the verifier commitment, the above
protocol can be shown to be sound against unbounded provers, and in particular efficient quantum provers.
One could expect that by instantiating the prover’s commitments so to guarantee hiding against quantum
adversaries, we would get post-quantum zero knowledge. However, we do not know how to prove that
such a protocol is zero knowledge against quantum verifiers. Indeed, the simulation strategy described
above fails due to two basic concepts of quantum information theory:
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• No Cloning: General quantum states cannot be copied. In particular, the simulator cannot take a
snapshot of the verifier’s state.
• Quantum State Disturbance: General quantum circuits, which in particular perform measure-
ments, are not reversible. Once the simulator evaluates the verifier’s quantum circuit to obtain its
challenge, the verifier’s original state (prior to this bogus execution) has already been disturbed
and cannot be recovered.
Watrous [Wat09] showed that in certain settings the rewinding barrier can be circumvented. He
presents a quantum rewinding lemma, which roughly shows that non-rewinding simulators that succeed
in simulating any prover message with noticeable probability can be amplified into full-fledged simulators
(provided certain independence conditions on the initial success probability). This allows proving that
classical protocols, like the polynomial sequential repetition of the GMW protocol, are post-quantum
zero knowledge (assuming commitments with hiding against quantum adversaries). The technique is
insufficient, however, to prove post-quantum zero knowledge of classical constant-round protocols, such
as the GK protocol described above. In GK-like protocols non-rewinding simulators with a noticeable
success probability are not known.
Can Non-Black-Box Techniques Cross the Quantum Barriers? Rewinding is, in fact, often an issue
also in the classical setting. Starting with the work of Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96b], it was shown
that constant-round zero-knowledge protocols with certain features, such as a public-coin verifier, cannot
be obtained using simulators that only use the verifier’s next message function as a black box. That is,
simulators that are based solely on rewinding. Surprisingly, Barak [Bar01] showed that these barriers
can be circumvented using non-black-box techniques. He constructed a constant-round public-coin
zero-knowledge protocol by having the simulator take advantage of the explicit circuit representation of
the verifier. Following Barak’s work, different non-black-box techniques have been introduced to solve
various problems in cryptography (c.f., [DGS09, CLP13, Goy13, BP15, CPS16]).
A natural question is whether we can leverage classical protocols with non-black-box simulators,
such as Barak’s, in order to circumvent the discussed barriers in the quantum setting. Trying to
answer this question reveals several challenges. One inherent challenge is that classical non-black-box
techniques naturally involve cryptographic tools that support classical computations. Obtaining zero
knowledge against quantum verifiers would require analogous tools for quantum computations. As an
example, Barak relies on the existence of constant-round succinct proof systems for the correctness of
classical computations; to obtain post-quantum zero knowledge, such a protocol would need to support
also quantum computations, while (honest) verification should remain classical. Existing protocols for
classical verification of quantum computations [Mah18b] are neither constant round nor succinct.
Another family of non-black-box techniques [BP15, BKP19], different from that of Barak, is based on
fully-homomorphic encryption. Here (as mentioned above) constructions for homomorphic evaluation
of quantum computations exist [Mah18a, Bra18]. The problem is that the mentioned non-black-box
techniques do perform state cloning. Roughly speaking, starting from the same state, they evaluate
the verifier’s computation (at least) twice: once homomorphically, under the encryption, and once in
the clear.2 An additional hurdle is proving soundness against quantum provers. Known non-black-box
techniques are sound against efficient classical provers, and often use tools that are not known in the
quantum setting, such as constant-round knowledge extraction, which is further discussed below.
Our main technical contribution is devising a non-black-box technique that copes with the above
challenges. We next explain the main ideas behind the technique.
2In fact, Barak’s technique also seems to require state cloning. Roughly speaking, the same verifier state is used once for
simulating the main verifier execution and once when computing the proof for the verifier’s computation.
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1.2.2 Our Technique: A No-Cloning Extraction Procedure
Toward describing the technique, we first restrict attention to a more specific problem. Specifically,
constructing a constant-round post-quantum zero-knowledge protocol can be reduced to the problem of
constructing constant-round quantumly-extractable commitments. We recall what such commitments are
and why they are sufficient, and then move to discuss the commitments we construct.
A quantumly-extractable commitment is a classical protocol between a sender S and a receiver R.
The protocol satisfies the standard (statistical) binding and post-quantum hiding, along with a plaintext
extraction guarantee. Extraction requires that there exists an efficient quantum simulator E that given
any malicious sender S∗, represented by a polynomial-size quantum circuit, can simulate the view of
S∗ in the commitment protocol while extracting the committed plaintext message. Specifically, E(S∗)
outputs a classical transcript T˜ , a verifier (quantum) state |ψ˜〉, and an extracted plaintext m˜ that are
computationally indistinguishable from a real transcript, state, and plaintext (T, |ψ〉,m), where T and
|ψ〉 are the transcript and sender state generated at the end of a real interaction between the receiver R
and sender S∗, andm is the plaintext fixed by the commitment transcript T .
Such commitments allow enhancing the classical four-step protocol described before to satisfy post-
quantum zero-knowledge. We simply instantiate the verifier’s commitment to the challenge β in step
(0) with a quantumly-extractable commitment. To simulate a malicious quantum verifier V ∗, the zero-
knowledge simulator can then invoke the commitment simulator E(V ∗), with V ∗ acting as the sender, to
obtain a simulated commitment as well as the corresponding challenge β. Now the simulator knows the
challenge ahead of time, before producing the prover message α in step (1), and using the (simulated)
verifier state |ψ˜〉, can complete the simulation, without any state cloning. (Proving soundness is actually
tricky on its own due to malleability concerns. We remain focused on zero knowledge.)
The challenge is of course to obtain constant-round commitments with no-cloning extraction. In-
deed, classically-extractable commitments have been long known in constant rounds under minimal
assumptions, based on rewinding (and thus state cloning) [PRS02]. We next describe our non-black-box
technique and how it enables quantum extraction without state cloning.
The Non-Black-Box Quantum Extraction Technique: A Simple Case. To describe the technique, we
first focus on a restricted class of adversarial senders that are non-aborting and explainable. The notion
of non-aborting explainable senders considers senders S∗ whose messages can always be explained
as a behavior of the honest (classical) sender with respect to some plaintext and randomness (finding
this explanation may be inefficient); in particular, they never abort. The notion further restricts that of
(aborting) explainable adversaries from [BKP19], which also allows aborts. To even further simplify
our exposition, we first address classical (rather than quantum) senders, but crucially, while avoiding any
form of state cloning. Later on, we shall address general quantum adversaries.
Our protocol is inspired by [BP15, BKP19] and relies on two basic tools. The first is fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE) — an encryption scheme that allows to homomorphically apply any
polynomial-size circuit C to an encryption of x to obtain a new encryption of C(x), proportional in
size to the result |C(x)| (the size requirement is known as compactness). The second is compute and
compare program obfuscation (CCO). A compute-and-compare programCC[f, u, z] is given by a func-
tion f (represented as a circuit), a target string u in its range, and a message z; it outputs z on every
input x such that f(x) = u, and rejects all other inputs. A corresponding obfuscator compiles any such
program into a program C˜C with the same functionality. In terms of security, provided that the target u
has high entropy conditioned on f and z, the obfuscated program is computationally indistinguishable
from a simulated dummy program, independent of (f, u, z). Such post-quantumly-secure obfuscators
are known under QLWE [GKW17, WZ17, GKVW19].
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To commit to a messagem, the protocol consists of three steps:
1. The sender S samples:
• two random strings u and v,
• a secret key sk for an FHE scheme,
• an FHE encryption ctv = FHE.Encsk(v) of v,
• an obfuscation C˜C of CC[f, u, z], where z = (m, sk) and f = FHE.Decsk is the FHE
decryption circuit.
It then sends (ctv, C˜C) to the receiver R.
2. The receiver R sends a guess v′.
3. S rewards a successful guess: if v = v′, it sends back u (and otherwise ⊥).
The described commitment protocol comes close to our objective. First, it is binding — the obfuscation
C˜C uniquely determines z = (m, sk). Second, it is hiding — a receiver (even if malicious) gains no
information about the message m. To see this, we argue that no receiver sends v′ = v at the second
message, but with negligible probability. Indeed, given only the first sender message (ctv, C˜C), the
receiver obtains no information about u. Hence, we can invoke the CCO security and replace the
obfuscation C˜C with a simulated one, which is independent of the secret FHE key sk. This, in turn,
allows us to invoke the security of encryption to argue that the first message (ctv, C˜C) hides v. It follows
that the third sender message is ⊥ (rather than the target u) with overwhelming probability, which again
by CCO security implies that the entire view of the receiver can be simulated independently ofm.
Lastly, a non-black-box simulator, given the circuit representation of an explainable sender S∗, can
simulate the sender’s view, while extracting m. It first runs the sender to obtain the first message
(ctv, C˜C). At this point, it can use the sender’s circuit S
∗ to continue the emulation of S∗ homomor-
phically under the encryption ctv. The key point is that, under the encryption, we do have v. We can
(homomorphically) feed v to the sender, and obtain an encryption ctu of u. Now, the simulator feeds ctu
to the obfuscation C˜C, and gets back z = (m, sk). (Note that here the compactness of FHE is crucial
— the sender S∗ could be of arbitrary polynomial size, whereas C˜C and thus also ctu are of fixed size.)
Having extracted m, it remains to simulate the inner (for now, classical) state ψ of the sender S∗
and the full interaction transcript T . These are actually available, but in encrypted form, as a result
of the previous homomorphic computation. Here we use the fact that the extracted z also includes the
decryption key sk, allowing us to obtain the state ψ and transcript T in the clear.
An essential difference between the above extraction procedure and previous non-black-box extraction
techniques (e.g. [BP15, BKP19] is that it does not perform any state cloning. As explained earlier,
previous procedures would perform the same computation twice, once under the encryption, and once in
the clear. Here we perform the computation once, partially in the clear, and partially homomorphically.
Crucially, we have a mechanism to peel off the encryption at the end of second part so that we do not
have to redo the computation in the clear.
Indistinguishability through Secure Function Evaluation. The described protocol does not quite
achieve our objective. The simulated interaction is, in fact, easy to distinguish from a real one. Indeed,
in a simulated interaction the simulator’s guess in the second message is v′ = v, whereas the receiver
cannot produce this value. To cope with this problem, we augment the protocol yet again, and perform the
second step under a secure function evaluation (SFE) protocol. This can be thought of as homomorphic
encryption with an additional circuit privacy guarantee, which says that the result of homomorphic
evaluation of a circuit, reveals nothing about the evaluated circuit to the decryptor, except of course from
the result of evaluation.
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The augmented protocol is similar to the previous one, except for the last two steps, now done using SFE:
1. The sender S samples:
• two random strings u and v,
• a secret key sk for an FHE scheme,
• an FHE encryption ctv = FHE.Encsk(v) of v,
• an obfuscation C˜C of CC[f, u, z], where z = (m, sk) and f = FHE.Decsk is the FHE
decryption circuit.
It then sends (ctv, C˜C) to the receiver R.
2. The receiver R sends ct′v′ , a guess v
′ encrypted using SFE. (The honest receiver sets v′ arbitrarily.)
3. S homomorphically evaluates the function that given input v, returns u (and otherwise ⊥).
Indistinguishability of the simulated sender view from the real sender view now follows since the SFE
encryption ct′v′ hides v
′. The SFE circuit privacy guarantees that the homomorphic SFE evaluation does
not leak any information about the target u, as long as the receiver does not send an SFE encryption of v.
A Malleability Problem and its Resolution. While we could argue before that a malicious receiver
cannot output v in the clear, arguing that it does not output an SFE encryption of v is more tricky. In
particular, the receiver might be able to somehow maul the FHE encryption ctv to get an SFE encryption
ct′v of the value v, without actually “knowing” the value v. Classically, such malleability problems are
solved using extraction. If we could efficiently extract the value encrypted in the SFE encryption ct′, then
we could rely on the previous argument. However, as explained before, efficient extraction is classically
achieved using rewinding and thus state cloning. While so far we have focused on avoiding state cloning
for the sake of simulating the sender, we should also avoid state cloning when proving hiding of the
commitment as we are dealing with quantum receivers. It seems like we are back to square one.
To circumvent the problem, we rely on the fact that the hiding requirement of the commitment is
relatively modest — commitments to different plaintexts should be indistinguishable. This is in contrast
the efficient simulation requirement for the sender (needed for efficient zero knowledge simulation). Here
one commonly used solution is complexity leveraging — we can design the SFE, FHE, and CCO so
that extraction from SFE encryptions can be done in brute force, without any state cloning, and without
compromising the security of the FHE and CCO. This comes at the cost of assuming subexponential
(rather than just polynomial) hardness of the primitives in use.
A different solution, which is also the one we use in the body of the paper, relies on hardness
against efficient quantum adversaries with non-uniform quantum advice (instead of subexponential hard-
ness). Here the receiver sends a commitment to the SFE encryption key in the beginning of the protocol.
The reduction establishing the hiding of the protocol gets as non-uniform advice the initial receiver
(quantum) state that maximizes the probability of breaking hiding, along with the corresponding SFE
key. This allows for easy extraction from SFE encryptions, without any state cloning.
The full solution contains additional steps meant to establish that the receiver’s messages are appro-
priately structured (e.g., the receiver’s commitment defines a valid SFE key, and the SFE encryption later
indeed uses that key). This is done using standard techniques based on witness-indistinguishable proofs,
which exist in a constant number of rounds [GMW86] assuming commitments with post-quantum hiding
(and in particular, QLWE).
Dealing with QuantumAdversaries. Above, we have assumed for simplicity that the sender is classical
and have shown a simulation strategy that requires no state cloning. We now explain how the protocol is
augmented to deal with quantum senders (for now still restricting attention to non-aborting explainable
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senders). The first natural requirement in order to deal with quantum senders is that the cryptographic
tools in use (e.g., SFE encryption) will be postqantum secure. This can be guaranteed assuming QLWE.
As already mentioned earlier in the introduction, post-quantum security alone is not enough — we
need to make sure that our non-black-box extraction technique can also work with quantum, rather than
classical, circuits representing the sender S∗. For this purpose, we use quantum fully-homomorphic
encryption (QFHE). In a QFHE scheme, the encryption and decryption keys are (classical) strings
and the encryption and decryption algorithms are classical provided that the plaintext is classical (and
otherwise quantum). Most importantly, QFHE allows to homomorphically evaluate quantum circuits.
Such QFHE schemes were recently constructed in [Mah18a, Bra18] based on QLWE and a circular
security assumption (analogous to the assumptions required for multi-key FHE in the classical setting).
The augmented protocol simply replaces the FHE schemewith aQFHE scheme (other primitives, such
as the SFE and compute-and-compare are completely classical in terms of functionality and only need to
be post-quantum secure). In the augmented protocol, the honest sender and receiver still act classically. In
contrast, the non-black-box simulator described before is now quantum — it homomorphically evaluates
the quantum sender circuit S∗. A technical point is that QFHE should support the evaluation of a
quantum circuit with an initial quantum state — in our case the quantum sender S∗ and its inner state
after it sends the first message. This is achieved by existing QFHE schemes (for instance, by using their
public key encryption mode, and encrypting the initial state prior to the computation).
Dealing with Aborts. So far, we have dealt with explainable senders that are non-aborting. This is
indeed a strong restriction and in fact, quantumly-extractable commitments against this class of senders
can be achieved using black-box techniques (see more in the related work section). However, considering
general adversaries who, with noticeable probability, may abort at some stage of the protocol, existing
black-box techniques completely fail. In contrast, as we explain next, our non-black-box technique
achieves a meaningful guarantee even against aborting senders.
In our protocol, an aborting sender S∗ may refuse to perform the SFE evaluation in the last step of
the protocol. In this case, the simulator will get stuck— the simulated transcript and sender state |ψ〉will
remain forever locked under the encryption (since the simulator cannot use the obfuscation C˜C to get the
decryption key sk). Nevertheless, in executions where there is no abort, the simulation is valid. That is,
non-aborting simulated executions are indistinguishable from non-aborting real executions; furthermore,
they occur with the same probability (up to a negligible difference).
Another feature of the protocol is that if aborting executions occur with noticeable probability, they
are easy to simulate by rejection sampling. To simulate an aborting execution, the simulator sends an
SFE encryption ct′v′ of some arbitrary string v
′ (e.g. the all-zero string). Crucially, it does so in the clear,
rather than under the encryption. This is repeated until an aborting execution is produced. The hiding of
SFE ciphertexts guarantee that this will occur with the right probability.
This gives rise to a full simulation strategy: (1) run the non-black-box simulator. If no abort occurs,
simulation succeeds. Otherwise, (2) simulate an abort. Some care has to be taken to make sure that the
expected running time of the simulator is polynomial. This is done using standard techniques [GK96a]
for estimating the probability of abort.
From Explainable Adversaries to Malicious Ones. The only remaining gap is the assumption that
senders are explainable; that is, the messages they send (up to the point that they possibly abort), can
always be explained as messages that would be sent by the honest (classical) sender for some plaintext
and randomness. The simulator we described crucially relies on this; in particular, the CCO C˜C and the
FHE ciphertext ctv must be formed consistently with each other for the simulator to work. Crucially, it
suffices that there exists an explanation for the messages, and we do not have to efficiently extract it as
part of the simulation;3 indeed, efficient quantum extraction is exactly the problem we are trying to solve.
3This is in contrast to other restrictions of the adversary considered in the literature, like semi-honest and semi-malicious
adversaries [GMW87, HIK+11, BGJ+13].
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The commitment protocol against explainable senders naturally gives rise to a zero-knowledge
protocol against explainable verifiers. As is often the case in the design of zero knowledge protocols
(see discussion in [BKP19]), dealing with explainable verifiers is actually the hard part of designing
zero-knowledge protocols. Specifically, we use a generic transformation of [BKP19], slightly adapted
to our setting, which converts zero-knowledge protocols against explainable verifiers to ones against
arbitrary malicious verifiers. The transformation is based on constant-round (post-quantumly-secure)
witness-indistinguishable proofs, which as mentioned before can be obtained based on QLWE.
A Note on Universal Simulators, Composition, and Verifiers with Quantum Advice. The traditional
zero knowledge requirement asks that for any malicious verifier V ∗, there exists a simulator SimV ∗ .
However, most classical protocols achieve a stronger guarantee that flips the order of quantifiers — they
provide one universal simulator Sim, which works for all verifiers. That is, Sim(x, V ∗) is given as input
the instance x in theNP language and any circuit V ∗ representing the verifier, and successfully simulates
the view of V ∗ in a real interaction. This stronger guarantee is especially useful for composition, namely,
when using the zero-knowledge protocol as a subroutine inside an (outer) protocol. This is because it
allows to hardwire the inner state s of the adversary in the (outer) protocol into the description of V ∗,
and modularly apply the simulation guarantee.
We achieve the same universal guarantee as above with respect to (non-uniform) quantum, rather
than classical, circuits. However, in the context of composability in the quantum setting, we may ask for
a stronger requirement. Specifically, we would like to be able to "hardwire" into V ∗ a quantum inner
state |ψ〉, that is not necessarily efficiently generatable. Indeed, if we wish to show post-quantum security
of an outer protocol that uses the zero-knowledge protocol as a subroutine, the state of the adversary
in the outer protocol is quantum, and when we perform an averaging argument (to modularly use the
ZK definition guarantee) and fix a specific quantum state for the verifier, that specific state might not
be efficiently generatable. Our protocol falls short of achieving this stronger feature of universality with
respect to quantum advice. In a nutshell, this is because whenever our non-black-box simulator gets stuck
due to an abort, we discard the simulation, and simulate from scratch an abort. The initial quantum state
|ψ〉 of the verifier is disturbed due to the first (stuck) simulation, preventing us from lawfully simulating
an abort relative to V ∗(|ψ〉).
The lack of universality with respect to quantum advice means that when using our zero-knowledge
protocol inside another protocol, one has to work harder and essentially reprove simulation validity,
rather than modularly use the universal simulation guarantee. We do, however, show a somewhat relaxed
form of universality with respect quantum advice, which does make composition more modular, but is
not as clean as full universality. The problem of (non-relaxed) universality with respect to quantum
advice is left open.
1.3 More Related Work on Post-Quantum Zero Knowledge
The study of post-quantum zero-knowledge (QZK) protocols was initiated by van de Graaf [VDGC97],
who first observed that traditional zero-knowledge simulation techniques, based on rewinding, fail against
quantum verifiers. Subsequent work has further explored different flavors of zero knowledge and their
limitations [Wat02], and also demonstrated that relaxed notions such as zero-knowledge with a trusted
common reference string can be achieved [Kob03, DFS04]. Watrous [Wat09] was the first to show that the
barriers of quantum information theory can be crossed, demonstrating a post-quantum zero-knowledge
protocol for NP (in a polynomial number of rounds).
Zero Knowledge for QMA. Another line of work aims at constructing quantum (rather than classical)
protocols for QMA (rather than NP). Following a sequence of works [BOCG+06, Liu06, DNS10,
DNS12, MHNF15], Broadbent, Ji, Song and Watrous [BJSW16] show a zero-knowledge quantum proof
system for all of QMA (in a polynomial number of rounds).
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Quantum Proofs and Arguments of Knowledge. Extracting knowledge from quantum adversaries
was investigated in a sequence of works [Unr12, HSS11, LN11, ARU14]. A line of works considered
different variants of quantum proofs and arguments of knowledge (of the witness), proving both feasibility
results and limitations. In particular, Unruh [Unr12] shows that assuming post-quantum injective one-
way functions, some existing systems are a quantum proof of knowledge. He identifies a certain strict
soundness requirement that suffices for such an implication. Ambainis, Rosmanis and Unruh [ARU14]
give evidence that this requirement may be necessary.
Based on QLWE, Hallgren, Smith, and Song [HSS11] and Lunemann and Nielsen [LN11] show
argument of knowledge where it is also possible to simulate the prover’s state (akin to our simulation
requirement of the sender’s state). Unruh further explores arguments of knowledge in the context of
computationally binding quantum commitments [Unr16b, Unr16a]. All of the above require a polynomial
number of rounds to achieve a negligible knowledge error.
Zero-Knowledge Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs. Two recent works by Chiesa et al. [CFGS18]
and by Grilo, Slofstra, and Yuen [GSY19] show that NEXP and MIP∗, respectively, have perfect
zero-knowledge multi-prover interactive proofs (against entangled quantum provers).
AWord on Strict Commitments and Non-Aborting Verifiers. In [Unr12], Unruh introduces a notion
of strict commitments, which are commitments that fix not only the plaintext, but also the randomness (e.g.
Blum-Micali [BM84]). As mentioned in our technical overview, using such commitments it is possible
to obtain zero-knowledge in constant rounds against non-aborting explainable verifiers through the GK
four-step template we discussed in the overview. Roughly speaking, this is because when considering
verifiers that always open their (strict) commitments, we are assured that measuring their answer does
not disturb the verifier state, as this answer is information theoretically fixed. This effectively allows to
perform rewinding.
2 Preliminaries
All algorithms of cryptographic functionalities in this work are implicitly efficient and classical (i.e.
require no quantum computation or a quantum communication channel), unless noted otherwise. We
rely on the standard notions of classical Turing machines and Boolean circuits:
• We say that a Turing machine (or algorithm) is PPT if it is probabilistic and runs in polynomial
time.
• We sometimes think about PPT Turing machines as polynomial-size uniform families of circuits
(as these are equivalent models). A polynomial-size circuit family C is a sequence of circuits
C = {Cλ}λ∈N, such that each circuit Cλ is of polynomial size λ
O(1) and has λO(1) input and
output bits. We say that the family is uniform if there exists a polynomial-time deterministic
Turing machineM that on input 1λ outputs Cλ.
• For a PPT Turing machine (algorithm)M , we denote byM(x; r) the output ofM on input x and
random coins r. For such an algorithm, and any input x, we may write m ∈ M(x) to denote the
fact thatm is in the support ofM(x; ·).
2.1 Quantum Computation
We use standard notions from quantum computation.
• We say that a Turing machine (or algorithm) is QPT if it is quantum and runs in polynomial time.
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• We sometimes think about QPT Turing machines as polynomial-size uniform families of quantum
circuits (as these are equivalent models). We call a polynomial-size quantum circuit familiy
C = {Cλ}λ∈N uniform if there exists a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine M that on
input 1λ outputs Cλ.
• Classical communication channels in the quantum setting are identical to classical communication
channels in the classical setting, except that when a set of qubits is sent through a classical
communication channel, then the qubits are automatically measured in the standard basis, and the
measured (now classical-state) qubits are then sent through the channel.
• A quantum interactive algorithm (in a 2-party setting) has input divided into two registers and
output divided into two registers. For the input qubits, one register is for an input message from
the other party, and a second register is for a potential inner state the machine held. For the output,
one register is for the message to be sent to the other party, and another register is for a potential
inner state for the machine to keep to itself.
Quantum Adversarial Model. As noted at the end of the technical overview, we would like to consider
security definitions that not only achieve quantum security, but are also composable and can be used
modularly inside other protocols. For this we think by default on security against polynomial-size
quantum adversaries with n.u. polynomial-size quantum advice (i.e. an arbitrary quantum mixed state
that’s not necessarily efficiently generatable).
In some of the security definitions we will explicitly note if the security is stronger (statistical
security, against unbounded algorithms) or standard quantum security (against non-uniform quantum
circuits without quantum advice), and in any case, security will always hold at least against non-uniform
quantum circuits (without arbitrary quantum advice). Accordingly, an adversary will be usually denoted
by A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, where {A
∗
λ}λ∈N is a polynomial-size non-uniform sequence of quantum circuits,
and {ρλ}λ∈N is some polynomial-size sequence of mixed quantum states. All adversaries are implicitly
unrestricted in their behaviour (i.e. they are fully malicious and can arbitrarily deviate from protocols).
We conclude with notions regarding indistinguishability in the quantum setting.
• A function f : N→ [0, 1] is,
– negligible if for every constant c ∈ N there existsN ∈ N such that for alln > N , f(n) < n−c.
– noticeable if there exists c ∈ N, N ∈ N s.t. for every n ≥ N , f(n) ≥ n−c.
• A quantum random variable is simply a random variable that can have values that are quantum
states. That is, a quantum r.v. induces a probability distribution over a (possibly infinite) set of
quantum states. Such quantum r.v. can be also thought of as a mixed quantum state, which is
simply a distribution over quantum states.
• For two quantum random variables X and Y , quantum distinguisher D with quantum mixed state
as auxiliary input ρ, and µ ∈ [0, 1], we write X ≈D(ρ),µ Y if
|Pr[D(X; ρ) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ; ρ) = 1]| ≤ µ.
• Two ensembles of quantum random variables X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are said to be
computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈c Y , if for every polynomial-size non-uniform
quantum distinguisher with quantum advice D = {Dλ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function
µ such that for all λ ∈ N,
Xλ ≈Dλ(ρλ), µ(λ) Yλ .
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• The trace distance between two quantum distributionsX, Y , denotedTD(X,Y ), is a generalization
of statistical distance to the quantum setting and represents the maximal distinguishing advantage
between two quantum distributions, by unbounded quantum algorithms. We thus say that X =
{Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are statistically indistinguishable (and write X ≈s Y), if for every
unbounded non-uniform quantum distinguisher D = {Dλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function
µ such that for all λ ∈ N,
TD(Xλ, Yλ) ≤ µ(λ) .
In what follows, we introduce the cryptographic tools we will use in this work. As a default, all
algorithms are classical and efficient unless noted otherwise, and security (which will be formally defined
for each primitive) holds against efficient non-uniform quantum adversaries.
2.2 Classical WI Proofs with Quantum Security
We use classical constant-round proof systems for NP (where both honest prover and verifier are classical
efficient algorithms) that are witness-indistinguishable, that is, the prover gets the privacy guarantee that
the transcripts it generates for two witnesses of the same instance, are indistinguishable (for quantum
attackers).
In what follows, we denote by (P,V) a protocol between two parties P and V. For common input x,
we denote by OUTV〈P,V〉(x) the output of V in the protocol. For honest verifiers, this output will be a
single bit indicating acceptance (or rejection), malicious quantum verifiers may have arbitrary quantum
output (which is captured by the verifier outputting its inner quantum state at the end of interaction).
Definition 2.1 (WI Proof System for NP). A protocol (P,V) with an honest PPT prover P and an honest
PPT verifier V for a language L ∈ NP is a witness-indistinguishable proof system if it satisfies:
1. Perfect Completeness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x),
Pr[OUTV〈P(w),V〉(x) = 1] = 1 .
2. Statistical Soundness: For any non-uniform unbounded prover P∗ = {P∗λ}λ, there exists a
negligible function µ(·) such that for any security parameter λ ∈ N and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [OUTV〈P
∗
λ,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
3. Witness Indistinguishability: For every non-uniform quantum polynomial-size verifier V∗ =
{V∗λ, ρλ}λ, for any two sequences of witnesses {wλ}λ∈N, {vλ}λ∈N s.t. for every λ ∈ N, wλ and
vλ are both witnesses for the same xλ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}
λ , we have,
{OUTV∗λ〈P(wλ),V
∗
λ(ρλ)〉(xλ)}λ∈N ≈c {OUTV∗λ〈P(vλ),V
∗
λ(ρλ)〉(xλ)}λ∈N .
Instantiations of WI proofs. 3-message classical proof systems with WI follow from classical zero-
knowledge proof systems such as the parallel repetition of the 3-coloring protocol [GMW91], which is
in turn based on non-interactive perfectly-binding commitments. For the proof system to be WI against
quantum attacks, we need the non-interactive commitments to be computationally hiding against quantum
attacks (rather only against classical attacks).
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2.3 Sigma Protocols for NP
We use the abstraction called Sigma Protocols, which are public-coin three-message proof systems that
only give a very weak zero-knowledge guarantee.
Definition 2.2. A sigma protocol for an NP relation R is a three-message protocol (α, β, γ) between a
PPT prover Σ.P and a public-coin PPT verifier Σ.V, with the following properties:
Completeness: for any (x,w) ∈ R, 〈Σ.P(w),Σ.V〉(x) = 1.
Statistical Soundness: for any non-uniform unbounded prover P∗ = {P∗λ}λ, there exists a negligible
function µ(·) such that for any security parameter λ ∈ N and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [〈P∗,Σ.V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
Special Zero-Knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator Σ.S such that,
{(α, γ) | (α, rα)← Σ.P1(x,w), γ = Σ.P3(x, rα;β)} (x,w)∈R
x,β∈{0,1}λ
≈c {(α, γ) ← Σ.S(x, β)} (x,w)∈R
x,β∈{0,1}λ
,
where rα is the prover’s inner state that it prints for itself along with outputting α.
The next claim follows from the special zero-knowledge requirement, and will be used throughout the
analysis.
Claim 2.1 (First-Message Indistinguishability). In every Σ protocol:
{α← Σ.P1(x,w)}(x,w)∈R
|x|=λ
≈c
{
α← Σ.S1(x, 0
λ)
}
(x,w)∈R
|x|=λ
,
where Σ.P1(x,w) and Σ.S1(x, β) are the distributions on the first message of the prover and simulator.
Proof Sketch. Note that the first prover message is computed independently of the verifier’s message.
The claim now follows by the special zero-knowledge guarantee.
Sigma protocols are known to follow from classical zero-knowledge proof systems such as the (parallel
repetition) of the 3-coloring protocol [GMW91], which is in turn based on non-interactive perfectly-
binding and computationally hiding commitments.
2.4 Compute-and-Compare Obfuscation
We define compute-and-compare (CC) circuits, and obfuscators for CC circuits. We start by defining the
class of compute-and-compare circuits.
Definition 2.3 (Compute-and-Compare Circuit). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ be a circuit, and let u ∈
{0, 1}λ, z ∈ {0, 1}∗ be strings. Then CC[f, u, z](x) is a circuit that returns z if f(x) = y, and ⊥
otherwise.
We now define compute-and-compare (CC) obfuscators (with perfect correctness). In what follows
Obf is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a CC circuit CC[f, u, z] and outputs a new circuit C˜C. (We
assume that the CC circuit CC[f, u, z] is given in some canonical description from which f , u, and z
can be read.)
Definition 2.4 (CCobfuscator). APPTalgorithmObf is a compute-and-compare obfuscator if it satisfies:
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1. Perfect Correctness: For any circuit f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ, u ∈ {0, 1}λ and z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
Pr
[
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n : C˜C(x) = CC[f, u, z](x)
∣∣∣ C˜C← Obf(CC[f, u, z])] = 1 .
2. Simulation: There exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for any polynomial-size classical circuit
family f = {fλ}λ∈N and polynomial-length output string z = {zλ}λ∈N,
{C˜C | u← Uλ, C˜C← Obf(CC[fλ, u, zλ])}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(1
|fλ|, 1|zλ|, 1λ)}λ∈N .
Instantiations. Compute-and-compare obfuscators with almost-perfect correctness are constructed in
[GKW17, WZ17] based on QLWE. Recently, CC obfuscators with perfect correctness were constructed
[GKVW19] by Goyal, Koppula, Vusirikala and Waters, also based on QLWE.
2.5 Non-Interactive Commitments
We define non-interactive commitment schemes with perfect binding and computational hiding (against
quantum attacks).
Definition 2.5 (Non-Interactive Commitment). A non-interactive commitment scheme is given by a PPT
algorithm Com(·) with the following syntax:
• cmt ← Com(1λ, x) : A randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ in unary
and input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a commitment cmt.
The commitment algorithm satisfies:
1. Perfect Binding: For any x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ of the same length, if cmt ∈ Com(1λ, x), cmt ∈
Com(1λ, x′), then x = x′.
2. Quantum Computational Hiding: For any pair of ℓ(λ)-length strings x0 = {x0,λ}λ∈N, x1 =
{x1,λ}λ∈N, where ℓ(λ) is a polynomial, we have,
{Com(1λ, x0,λ)}λ∈N ≈c {Com(1
λ, x1,λ)}λ∈N .
Instantiations. The above non-interactive commitments are known based on various standard assump-
tions, including QLWE [GHKW17, LS19].
2.6 Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption
In our protocol we will be using a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme, specifically, a scheme
where a classical input can be encrypted classically and a quantum input quantumly. Moreover, we can
evaluate an encrypted input that was partially encrypted classically and partially quantumly, and if part
of the output is classical, it can be decrypted by a classical decryption algorithm. The formal definition
follows.
Definition 2.6 (Quantum Fully-Homomorphic Encryption). A quantum fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme is given by six algorithms (QHE.Keygen, QHE.Enc, QHE.QEnc, QHE.Dec, QHE.QDec,
QHE.Eval) with the following syntax:
• (pk, sk) ← QHE.Keygen(1λ) : A PPT algorithm that given a security parameter, samples a
classical public key and a classical secret key.
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• c← QHE.Encpk(b) : A PPT algorithm that takes as input a bit b and outputs a classical ciphertext.
• |φ〉 ← QHE.QEncpk(|ψ〉) : A QPT algorithm that takes as input a qubit |ψ〉 and outputs a
ciphertext represented in qubits.
• b ← QHE.Decsk(c) : A PPT algorithm that takes as input a classical ciphertext c and outputs a
bit.
• |ψ〉 ← QHE.QDecsk(|φ〉) : A QPT algorithm that takes as input a quantum ciphertext |φ〉 and
outputs a qubit.
• cˆ, ˆ|Φ〉 ← QHE.Evalpk(C, |Φ〉) : A QPT algorithm that takes as input:
1. A general quantum circuit C with ℓ input qubits and ℓ′ output qubits, out of which m are
measured.
2. A quantum ciphertext |Φ〉 that encrypts an ℓ-qubit state, some of the ℓ ciphertexts are possibly
classical ciphertexts (generated by the classical encryption algorithm) encrypting classical
bits.
The evaluation algorithm outputs a classical ciphertext cˆ encrypting m bits, plus a quantum
ciphertext ˆ|Φ〉 encrypting an (ℓ′ −m)-qubit quantum state.
The scheme satisfies the following.
• Quantum Semantic Security: The encryption algorithm maintains quantum semantic security.
• Compactness: There exists a polynomial poly(·) s.t. for every quantum circuit C with ℓ′ output
qubits and an enryption of an input forC , the output size of the evaluation algorithm is poly(λ, ℓ′),
where λ is the security parameter of the scheme.
• Classicality-Preserving Quantum Homomorphism: Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a polynomial-size
quantum circuit (where Cλ has m(λ) measured output qubits4), let |Ψ〉 = {|Ψ〉λ}λ∈N be an
input state for C , let (pk, sk) = {(pkλ, skλ)}λ∈N be a pair of public and secret keys (∀λ ∈ N :
(pkλ, skλ) ∈ QHE.Keygen(1
λ)) and let r = {rλ}λ be randomness for the encryption algorithm.
Then there exists a negligible function µ(·) s.t. for all λ ∈ N,
TD(ρ0,λ, ρ1,λ) ≤ µ(λ) ,
where ρ0, ρ1 are the quantum distributions which are defined as follows:
– ρ0,λ : Encrypt each classical bit of |Ψ〉 with QHE.Encpk(·) and the rest withQHE.QEncpk(·)
(the randomness r is the total randomness used for all encryptions). ExecuteQHE.Evalpk(C, ·)
on the encryption to get cˆ, ˆ|Φ〉, where cˆ is a classical ciphertext encrypting m(λ) bits. Then
output QHE.Decsk (cˆ) ,QHE.QDecsk( ˆ|Φ〉).
– ρ1,λ : Output C (|ψ〉).
Comments about the definition:
• For the definition of quantum semantic security see [BJ15].
4Out of some total number of output qubits ℓ′(λ).
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• A circuit withmmeasured output qubits is one where the leftmostm output qubits are measured in
the standard basis before they are outputted, the rest of the output qubits can either be measured or
not. The choice of the classical bits being lefmost is arbitrary and is only for the sake of simplicity.
If desired, our model (with the classical output on the left) can be adapted by adding swap gates to
circuits with spread-out classical output (just before the end of computation).
• It might look weird at first that we don’t let the evaluation algorithm QHE.Eval explicitly know
which of the ciphertexts its about to process are classical. This is not a problem, since the evaluation
algorithm treats quantum ciphertexts and classical ciphertexts all the same; they take the same
amount of qubits, and the algorithm performs on them exactly the same computations.
Instantiations. Mahadev and Brakerski [Mah18a, Bra18] show how to build quantum FHE from
standard cryptographic assumptions; QLWE, plus a circular security assumption. The above definition
is more general then how quantum FHE is defined in these works. Specifically, classicality-preserving
quantum homomorphism with statistical correctness for every pair (pk, sk) of public and secret keys and
randomness r for the encryption algorithm, is not explicitly defined there. However, the construction of
Brakerski actually does achieve this more general definition. This follows readily from the main theorem
(4.1) in [Bra18].
2.7 Function-Hiding Secure Function Evaluation
We define two-message function evaluation protocols with statistical circuit privacy and quantum input
privacy.
Definition 2.7 (2-Message Function Hiding SFE). A two-message secure function evaluation protocol
(SFE.Gen, SFE.Enc, SFE.Eval, SFE.Dec) has the following syntax:
• dk ← SFE.Gen(1λ) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ and outputs a
secret key dk.
• ct ← SFE.Encdk(x) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a string x ∈ {0, 1}
∗, and outputs a
ciphertext ct.
• cˆt ← SFE.Eval(C, ct) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a (classical) circuit C and a ciphertext
ct and outputs an evaluated ciphertext cˆt.
• xˆ = SFE.Decdk(cˆt) : a deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext cˆt and outputs a string xˆ.
For any polynomial-size family of classical circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N (for every λ ∈ N, Cλ is a set of circuits)
the scheme satisfies:
• Perfect Correctness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and circuit C ∈ Cλ,
Pr
SFE.Decdk(cˆt) = C(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
dk← SFE.Gen(1λ),
ct← SFE.Encdk(x),
cˆt← SFE.Eval(C, ct)
 = 1 .
• Quantum Input Privacy: For any polynomial ℓ(λ) and polynomial-size quantum adversary
A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every two length-ℓ(λ)
messages {x0,λ}λ∈N, {x1,λ}λ∈N, for every λ ∈ N:
Pr
A∗λ(ct) = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b← {0, 1},
dk← SFE.Gen(1λ),
ct ← SFE.Encdk(xb)
 ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) .
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• Statistical Circuit Privacy: There exist unbounded algorithms, probabilistic Sim and determin-
istic Ext, such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, ct ∈ SFE.Enc(x), the extractor outputs Ext(ct) = x,
and:
{SFE.Eval(C, ct∗)} λ∈N,C∈Cλ,
ct∗∈{0,1}poly(λ)
≈s {Sim(C(Ext(ct
∗; 1λ)); 1λ)} λ∈N,C∈Cλ,
ct∗∈{0,1}poly(λ)
.
The next claim follows directly from the circuit privacy property, and will be used throughout the analysis.
Claim 2.2 (Evaluations of Agreeing Circuits are Statistically Close). Let ct∗ = {ct∗λ}λ∈N be a (possibly
non-ciphertext) poly(λ)-length string, and let C0 = {C0,λ}λ∈N, C1 = {C1,λ}λ∈N be two circuits such
that ∀λ ∈ N : C0,λ(Ext(ct
∗
λ; 1
λ)) = C1,λ(Ext(ct
∗
λ; 1
λ)). Then
{SFE.Eval(C0,λ, ct
∗
λ)}λ∈N ≈s {SFE.Eval(C1,λ, ct
∗
λ)}λ∈N .
Such secure function evaluation schemes are known based on post-quantum hardness of QLWE
[OPCPC14, BD18].
3 Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Arguments for NP with Quantum
Security
In this section we construct a classical argument system for an arbitrary NP language L, with a constant
number of rounds, quantum soundness and quantum zero-knowledge. More formally, we construct a
constant-round protocol satisfying the following definition (in the definition below, OUTV∗〈P(w),V
∗〉(x)
denotes the interaction transcript between P(w) and V∗, and V∗’s inner quantum state at the end of this
interaction).
Definition 3.1 (Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Argument for NP). A classical protocol (P,V) with
an honest PPT prover P and an honest PPT verifier V for a language L ∈ NP is a quantum-secure
zero-knowledge argument if it satisfies:
1. Perfect Completeness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x),
Pr[OUTV〈P(w),V〉(x) = 1] = 1 .
2. Quantum Computational Soundness: For any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size prover
P∗ = {P∗λ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for any security parameter λ ∈ N
and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [OUTV〈P
∗
λ,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
3. Quantum Computational Zero-Knowledge: There exists a quantum expected polynomial-time
simulator Sim, such that for any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size verifier V∗ = {V∗λ}λ∈N,
{OUTV∗λ〈P(w),V
∗
λ〉(x)} λ∈N,
x∈L∩{0,1}λ ,
w∈RL(x)
≈c {Sim(x,V
∗
λ)} λ∈N,
x∈L∩{0,1}λ,
w∈RL(x)
.
• If the verifier is a classical circuit, then the simulator is computable by a classical expected
polynomial-time algorithm.
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Asmentioned in the technical overview and preliminaries, we actually prove a definiton a bit stronger
then post-quantum security, that is also quantumly-semi-composable. The definition makes it possible
to use the protocol as a subprotocol inside an outer protocol, in particular enabling to prove security
against quantum adversaries with quantum advice, in many cryptographic settings. Roughly, the stronger
definition states that even if the verifier has an arbitrary polynomial-size quantum advice, as long as
the simulator has oracle access to samples of pairs of instance (for the zero-knowledge protocol) and
quantum advice (for the malicious verifier), protocol can be simulated. On the soundness side, security
simply holds against provers with quantum advice. The definition is given below.
Definition 3.2 (Instance-Advice Distribution). Let ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N be a sequence of polynomial-size
quantum mixed states. We say that ρ is an instance-advice distribution (for the language L ∈ NP) if for
every λ ∈ N there exists a witness wλ ∈ RL(λ)5 s.t. the first λ qubits of ρλ always contain an instance
x ∈ L, |x| = λ s.t. wλ ∈ RL(x).
Definition 3.3 (Quantum-Semi-Composable (QSC) Zero-Knowledge Argument for NP). A classical
protocol (P,V) with an honest PPT prover P and an honest PPT verifier V for a language L ∈ NP is a
quantum-semi-composable (QSC) zero-knowledge argument if it satisfies:
1. Perfect Completeness: As in the above definition.
2. Quantum (Advice) Computational Soundness: For any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size
prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N (with advice), there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for any
security parameter λ ∈ N and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [OUTV〈P
∗
λ(ρλ),V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
3. Quantum-Semi-Composable Computational Zero-Knowledge: There exists a quantum ex-
pected polynomial-time simulator Sim, such that for any polynomial-size quantum verifier V∗ =
{V∗λ}λ∈N and polynomial-size instance-advice distribution ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N,
{x,OUTV∗
λ
〈P(wλ),V
∗
λ(ρ
(x)
λ )〉(x) | (x, ρ
(x)
λ )← ρλ}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(V
∗
λ, Oρλ)}λ∈N ,
where,
• For a mixed state σ, Oσ is an inputless oracle that upon activation returns a sample σ.
The above definition is clearly stronger then the standard one, as for a verifier without quantum advice,
the simulator always "have oracle access to the verifier’s advice". As for why this definition is somewhat
composable inside quantum-secure protocols, in section 4 we use the semi-composable definition as part
of the security proof of the quantum-secure (fully-simulatable) coin-flipping protocol, and it is made
clear there how to use the definition. As a side note, it is worth noting that in our construction, proving
that the protocol is QSC ZK rather than standard post-quantum ZK is practically the same.
Ingredients and notation:
• A non-interactive commitment scheme Com.
• A CC obfuscator Obf.
• A quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme (QHE.Keygen,QHE.Enc,QHE.QEnc,QHE.Dec,
QHE.QDec,QHE.Eval).
5RL(λ) is the set of all witnesses of λ-sized instances, that is,w ∈ RL(λ) iff there exists x ∈ L∩{0, 1}
λ s.t. w ∈ RL(x).
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• A 2-message function-hiding secure function evaluation scheme (SFE.Gen, SFE.Enc, SFE.Eval,
SFE.Dec).
• A public-coin 3-message WI proof (WI.P,WI.V).
• A 3-message sigma protocol (Σ.P,Σ.V) for the language L with quantum security.
Handling Aborts and Alikes. For the simplicity of describing the protocol and to avoid distractions
from unimportant technical issues, we set a convention to handle publicly checkable misbehaviors by the
parties in the protocol.
For a security parameter λ, for each message in the protocol, it is known (publicly) based on λ, what
is the length of each message (or upper and lower bounds on that length). If a party sends a message in
an incorrect length, the receiving party fixes it locally and trivially; if the message is too long, it cuts the
message in a suitable place, and if it’s too short then pads with zeros.
In the below protocol, whenever a party either aborts or fails to prove its statement in its WI
proof (which is publicly verifiable), the other party ends communication, and if the party that ends
communication is the verifier, it also rejects.
We describe the protocol in Figure 1.
3.1 Quantum Soundness
We will reduce the soundness of the sigma protocol to the soundness of the ZK protocol.
Lemma 3.1. Protocol 1 has quantum soundness.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction there exists a quantum prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρ
′
λ}λ∈N that (for infinitely
manyλ ∈ N) breaks soundnesswith noticeable probability. We construct a successfully cheating quantum
prover Σ.P∗ = {Σ.P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N for the sigma protocol. Σ.P
∗ will be a quantum circuit that uses P∗ to
interact with Σ.V and to break soundness of the sigma protocol, by simulating to P∗ the honest verifier’s
V responses.
Using a simple averaging argument, we can assume w.l.o.g. that P∗ = {P∗λ, ρ
′
λ}λ∈N always sends
a fixed first message (which is cmt1, cmt2), as we can consider the message and inner quantum state
that maximizes the malicious prover’s probability to cheat (this is enabled because this is the first
protocol message and does not depend on a message from the verifier). We further add that because P∗
succeeds in convincing V to accept instances that are not in L with a noticeable probability, and by the
soundness of the WI proof that the prover gives in step 5 of the protocol, it is in particular guaranteed
that the commitment cmt1 that P
∗ sends in the first message is valid, that is, there are fixed string and
randomness z, rz ∈ {0, 1}
∗ s.t. cmt1 = Com(1
λ, z; rz). As part of the non-uniform quantum advice ρ
of Σ.P∗, it will have the quantum advice of P∗, plus the information z, rz .
The operation of Σ.P∗ is described below. All operations of P∗ below are implicitly executed by
Σ.P∗ (who also keeps track of the quantum inner state of P∗ and executes P∗ with that state) and the
messages that P∗ "sends" are obtained by Σ.P∗.
Σ.P∗(ρ):
1. P∗ sends cmt1, cmt2.
2. Σ.P∗ takes the role of V during step 2 and interacts with P∗, with two changes:
• Σ.P∗ does not compute β, and in step 2a it just uses 0|β|.
• In step 2c it does not actually send an SFE evaluation ofCC[Id(·), t, s], but instead performs
an SFE evaluation of C⊥, a circuit that always outputs ⊥.
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Protocol 1
Common Input: An instance x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, for security parameter λ ∈ N.
P’s private input: A polynomial-size classical witness w ∈ RL(x) showing that x ∈ L.
1. Initial Commitment by the Prover: P computes dk ← SFE.Gen(1λ) and sends non-
interactive commitments to the witness w and the SFE secret key dk: cmt1 ← Com(1
λ, w),
cmt2 ← Com(1
λ, dk).
2. Extractable Commitment to a Challenge by the Verifier: V computes a challenge β ←
Σ.V, and proceeds to the following.
(a) V computes s← Uλ, t← Uλ, (pk, sk)← QHE.Keygen(1
λ) and sends
pk, ctV ← QHE.Encpk(t), C˜C← Obf
(
CC
[
QHE.Decsk(·), s, (sk, β)
])
.
(b) P sends ctP ← SFE.Encdk(0
λ), where dk is the SFE key that the prover sent inside
cmt2.
(c) V sends cˆt← SFE.Eval
(
CC
[
Id(·), t, s
]
, ctP
)
, where Id(·) is the identity function.
3. Sigma Protocol Messages Exchange:
(a) P computes α← Σ.P(x,w) and sends α.
(b) V sends the public-coin challenge β itself.
4. WI Proof by the Verifier: V interacts with P through (WI.PV,WI.VV) to give P a WI proof
of the following statement:
• The transcript of the verifier so far is explainable.
• Or, there is a non-witness u /∈ RL(x) and randomness r ∈ {0, 1}
∗ s.t. cmt1 =
Com(1λ, u; r).
5. WI Proof by the Prover: P interacts with V through (WI.PP,WI.VP) and uses the witness
w in order to prove to V the following:
• cmt1, cmt2 are both valid commitments and furthermore cmt2 is a commitment
to the SFE key from the verifier’s extractable commitment. That is, there exist
z, dk′, y, r1, r2, rSFE.Gen, rSFE.Enc ∈ {0, 1}
∗ s.t. cmt1 = Com(1
λ, z; r1), cmt2 =
Com(1λ, dk′; r2), dk
′ = SFE.Gen(1λ; rSFE.Gen), ctP = SFE.Encdk′(y; rSFE.Enc).
• Or, x ∈ L.
6. Information Reveal by the Prover: P sends γ = Σ.P(x,w;α, β).
7. Acceptance: V accepts if Σ.V(α, β, γ) = 1.
Figure 1: A classical constant-round zero-knowledge argument for L ∈ NP with quantum security.
At the end of this step, Σ.P∗ starts communicating with the sigma protocol verifier Σ.V.
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3. P∗ sends α, Σ.P∗ delivers the message to Σ.V.
4. Σ.V answers with β, Σ.P∗ delivers the message to P∗.
5. Σ.P∗ takes the role of V in step 4 of the protocol and communicates with P∗, and uses the
information (z, rz) as witness for the WI statement (z is necessarily a non-witness for x, because
x /∈ L).
6. Σ.P∗ takes the role of V and interacts with P∗ while P∗ gives a WI proof.
7. P∗ sends γ, Σ.P∗ delivers it to Σ.V.
In order to show that the soundness reduction works, it will be enough to show that the transcripts that
are generated by the reduction procedure, conditioned that P∗ succeeds to prove its WI statement (in step
5), are computationally indistinguishable from transcripts generated by the real interaction between P∗
and V (under the same condition that P∗ succeeds to prove its WI statement), this is captured by Claim
3.1.
Note that if we prove this indistinguishability, our soundness proof is finished. To see this, observe
that if the claim is true then in particular the probability that at the end of the real interaction we
have 1 = Σ.V(α, β, γ) is negligibly close to the probability that in the reduction interaction we have
1 = Σ.V(α, β, γ) (note that V accepts only if the WI proof by the prover was accepted). Because
we assume (towards contradiction) that the probability for 1 = Σ.V(α, β, γ) in the real interaction is
noticeable, the probability for this event will also be noticeable in the reduction setting, which implies
that Σ.P∗ breaks the soundness of the sigma protocol, in contradiction. Thus all that remains is to prove
Claim 3.1.
Claim 3.1 (Soundness Reduction Transcripts Indistinguishability). Let {VIEWP∗〈P
∗
λ(ρ
′
λ),V〉⊥(xλ)}λ∈N
denote the distribution over transcripts and inner quantum state of P∗ generated by interaction between
the malicious prover and the honest verifier of the ZK protocol, s.t. if P∗ fails to prove its WI statement, the
process output is⊥. Let {VIEWP∗〈P
∗
λ(ρ
′
λ),Σ.P
∗
λ(ρλ)〉⊥(xλ)}λ∈N denote the distribution over transcripts
and inner quantum state of P∗ generated by the interaction in the soundness reduction described above,
s.t. if P∗ fails to prove its WI statement, the process output is ⊥. Then,
{VIEWP∗〈P
∗
λ(ρ
′
λ),V〉⊥(xλ)}λ∈N ≈c {VIEWP∗〈P
∗
λ(ρ
′
λ),Σ.P
∗
λ(ρλ)〉⊥(xλ)}λ∈N .
Proof. Define the following hybrid distributions on transcripts.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ : A process that acts like VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉⊥, except that in step 4, V uses the
information (z, rz) as a witness for its WI statement, instead of the witness that shows its transcript
is explainable.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ : Recall that we assume w.l.o.g. that P
∗ sends valid commitments cmt1, cmt2
in its first message, in particular there’s an SFE secret key dk ∈ SFE.Gen(1λ) s.t. cmt2 ∈
Com(1λ, dk). Now we can describe the current process: In this process, V has also the information
dk, and the process acts like VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ , except that when V gets the prover message ctP∗
in step 2b, it performs the following check: If t = SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) then the process halts and
outputs ⊥, otherwise the interaction carries on regularly.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(3)
⊥ : A process that acts like VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ , except that in step 2c, instead of
performing an SFE evaluation of CC[Id(·), t, s], the verifier performs an SFE evaluation of C⊥.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(4)
⊥ : Similar to VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(3)
⊥ except that the verifier does not perform the
check at step 2b like described in VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ .
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• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(5)
⊥ : In this process, V acts as in VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(4)
⊥ , but with one change; in step
2a it uses 0|β| instead of the β it computed with Σ.V. Observe that this distribution is exactly
VIEWP∗〈P
∗,Σ.P∗〉⊥.
We now explain whyVIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉⊥ is computationally indistinguishable fromVIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ ,
and why each consecutive pair of distributions are computationally indistinguishable. By the transitivity
of computational indistinguisability, this finishes our proof.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉⊥ ≈c VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ : Follows from the witness indistinguishability property
of the WI proof that the verifier gives.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ ≈s VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ : This indistinguishability is in fact also a statistical one.
This follows from Claim 3.2, which basically says that the probability that ctP∗ is an encryption
of t with the secret key dk is negligible, and thus the erasure of such cases can’t be noticed by a
distinguisher.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ ≈s VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(3)
⊥ : As a basic explanation, this statistical indistinguisha-
bility follows from the combination of the circuit privacy property of the SFE (specifically, Claim
2.2) and the soundness of the WI proof that the prover gives.
As a fuller explanation, assume towards contradiction there’s a distinguisher D∗ that tells the
difference between the two distributions, and by an averaging argument, consider the transcript (and
inner quantum state of P∗) generated at the end of step 2b, which maximizes D∗’s distinguisability
adventage - this transcript fixes in particular the prover’s ciphertext ctP∗ , and t, s, which in turn fix
the circuit CC
[
Id(·), t, s
]
. We now consider three cases, and explain why we get a contradiction
in each of them.
1. ctP∗ ∈ SFE.Encdk(t): In this case, no matter what will be generated next in the transcript,
the output will be ⊥ (by the check described in the description of VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ ), thus
it is impossible to distinguish the outputs of the two processes and we get a contradiction.
2. ∃y ∈ {0, 1}λ \ {t} s.t. ctP∗ ∈ SFE.Encdk(y): In this case, ⊥ = CC
[
Id(·), t, s
]
(y) and thus
we get a contradiction by using the circuit privacy property of the SFE (Claim 2.2).
3. Else: In that case, either ctP∗ is a ciphertext encrypted with some other SFE key dk
′, or it’s not
a ciphertext at all. In these cases, the WI statement of the prover is necessarily false, and thus
a non-⊥ output happens with at most negligible probability in both cases (by the soundness
of the WI proof of P∗), thus the statistical distance between them is at most negligible, in
contradiction to the assumption that D∗ distinguishes with noticeable probability.
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(3)
⊥ ≈s VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(4)
⊥ : Follows from the same reasoning as in the indistin-
guishability VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(1)
⊥ ≈s VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(2)
⊥ .
• VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(4)
⊥ ≈c VIEWP∗〈P
∗,V〉
(5)
⊥ : Follows from the simulation property (obfuscation
security) of the CC obfuscation scheme.
Claim 3.2 (Producing an SFE Encryption of t with dk is Hard). There’s a negligible function µ(·) s.t.
the probability that in step 2b, P∗ sends ctP∗ s.t. t = SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) (where dk is the SFE key inside
cmt2), is bounded by µ(λ).
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Proof. The proof will be based on the security of QHE.Enc, and on the simulation property (security)
of the CC obfuscation. We start with observing that the security of QHE.Enc implies that for every
efficient quantum adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, there’s a negligible function µ(·) s.t. the probability
that A∗ finds t given pk, ct ← QHE.Encpk(t) for a uniformly random chosen t ∈ {0, 1}
λ, is bounded by
µ(λ) - we will assume towards contradiction that our claim is false, that is, we assume that P∗ sends ctP∗
s.t. t = SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) with noticeable probability (for infinitely many security parameters), and get
a contradiction with the last claim about the hardness of descovering a random encrypted t.
Using P∗ and the fact that t = SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) with noticeable probability, we now describe a
(non-uniform) algorithm A∗ that finds t given pk, ct ← QHE.Encpk(t) for t ← Uλ and thus breaks the
encryption security ofQHE.Enc. As part of the non-uniform advice ofA∗, it will have the information dk.
So, given pk, ct ← QHE.Encpk(t), the algorithm A
∗ will use the simulator SimCC (from the simulation
property of the CC obfuscation) and send to P∗ the following, as the protocol message sent at step 2a,
pk, ct, SimCC(1|QHE.Dec0|sk| |, 1|sk|+|β|, 1λ) ,
where QHE.Dec0|sk| is the (classical) decryption circuit of the QHE, where the secret key input is
hard-wired to be 0|sk|. P∗ will respond with ctP∗ , and A
∗ uses dk to output SFE.Decdk(ctP∗).
We now use the simulation property guarantee of the CC obfuscation: Note that the proba-
bility that P∗ outputs ctP∗ s.t. SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) = t in the simulated setting, where A
∗ sends
SimCC(1|QHE.Dec0|sk| |, 1|sk|+|β|, 1λ) instead of C˜C, is negligibly close to the probability that it outputs
ctP∗ s.t. SFE.Decdk(ctP∗) = t in the regular setting where it gets C˜C - this is due to the security of the
CC obfuscator. Because we know that in the regular interaction, P∗ sends ctP∗ s.t. t = SFE.Decdk(ctP∗)
with a noticeable probability (for infinitely many security parameters), this implies that so does A∗, in
contradiction.
3.2 Quantum Zero-Knowledge
We construct a simulator Sim that for every quantum verifier V∗ and an instance-advice distribution ρ,
simulates an output distribution that is computationally indistinguishable from the output distribution
generated by choosing a random instance and advice (x, ρ(x)) from ρ, and then executing the interaction
between the honest prover and V∗(ρ(x)). Sim uses as input the verifier’s circuit and an access to copies
of ρ, and is described below. Every time the verifier circuit V∗ is executed, it is implicitly the simulator
Sim executing it, who also keeps track of the quantum inner state of V∗ during the simulated interaction.
Handling Aborts in Simulation. In the below simulation, the simulator can halt simulation and
choose to "simulate an abort" - this means it discards all information kept so far, and then executs
SimAbort(V∗, Oρ). This happens when the verifier either aborts, or fails to prove the statement in its
WI proof (for messages of incorrect length, the simulator acts like the prover and trivially corrects the
messages).
Sim(V∗, Oρ) :
1. Simulation of Initial Commitments: Sim samples (x, ρ(x)) ← Oρ, sets ρ
(x) to be the inner
state of V∗ (and sets x to be at the beginning of the simulator’s output transcript). Sim then
computes dk← SFE.Gen(1λ) and sends to V∗ the commitments cmt1 ← Com(1
λ, 0|w|), cmt2 ←
Com(1λ, dk).
2. Extraction Attempt:
(a) V∗ sends pk, ctV∗ , C˜C, and also outputs an inner state |ψ〉.
(b) Sim performs a non-black-box step and uses the circuit V∗:
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i. Sim computes ctSFEV∗ ← QHE.Evalpk(SFE.Encdk(·), ctV∗), where dk is the SFE key that
is inside cmt2. Sim also computes ct|ψ〉 ← QHE.QEncpk(|ψ〉).
Observe that at this point, if ctV∗ is indeed a QHE encryption of some t (using the public
key pk), then the joint ciphertext (ctSFEV∗ , ct|ψ〉) encrypts (SFE.Encdk(t), |ψ〉).
ii. Sim performs a quantumhomomorphic evaluation of the verifier’s response. It computes,(
ctSFEs , ct|φ〉
)
← QHE.Evalpk
(
V∗,
(
ctSFEV∗ , ct|ψ〉
))
.
Observe that if, in addition to sending an encryption for t last step, the verifier’s circuit
indeed performed an SFE evaluation of the circuit CC[Id(·), t, s], then the joint cipher-
text (ctSFEs , ct|φ〉) encrypts (SFE.Encdk(s), |φ〉), where |φ〉 is the inner quantum state of
V∗ after the SFE evaluation.
iii. Sim computes cts ← QHE.Evalpk
(
SFE.Decdk(·), ct
SFE
s
)
, and then computes (sk, β′) =
C˜C(cts).Finally, Simobtains the inner state ofV
∗ bydecryption: |φ〉 ← QHE.Decsk(ct|φ〉).
3. Sigma Protocol Messages Simulation:
(a) Sim executes (α, γ) ← Σ.S(x, β′) (the simulator from the special zero-knowledge property
of the sigma protocol) and sends α to V∗.
(b) V∗ returns β.
4. WI Proof by the Malicious Verifier: Sim takes the role of the honest prover P in the WI proof
V∗ gives. If V∗ fails to prove the statement, Sim executes SimAbort.
5. Simulation of the Prover’s WI Proof and Information Reveal: Sim gives V∗ a WI proof using
the witness that shows cmt1, cmt2 are both valid commitments (and that cmt2 is a commitment to
the SFE key dk used in step 2b). After the proof, Sim sends γ to V∗.
Sim outputs x, the interaction transcript and the inner quantum state ofV as the simulation’s output.
SimAbort(V∗, Oρ):
1. Estimation of Probability to Abort in Simulated Transcript: Iterate and execute the following
until either there are λ2 aborts, or 2λ iterations have passed: Sample ρ ← Oρ and execute
Sim(V∗, ρ) until the end of the WI proof inside step 5 of the simulation (i.e. do not perform the
sending of γ), and if at some point the verifier either aborted or failed in its WI proof, count it as
an abort.
If you exitted the loop because you ran for 2λ iterations without sufficient aborts, halt and output
Fail. Otherwise, let N denote the number of iterations (N is a random variable), and set
a′(ρ) = λ
2
N .
2. Attempt to Get a Valid Abort Transcript: Iterate until either you get an abort, or λ ·
⌈
1
a′(ρ)
⌉
iterations have passed:
• Sample (x, ρ(x))← Oρ and set ρ
(x) to be the inner state of V∗, and x be at the beginning of
the output transcript.
• Interact with V∗ as the honest prover P until the end of step 5 of the original protocol, with
exactly 3 differences:
– The commitment cmt1 is a commitment to 0
|w| rather than to w.
– The message α at step 3a is generated by the first-message simulator α ← Σ.S1(x, 0
λ)
(from claim 2.1), and not by the sigma protocol prover.
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– At step 5, the witness used is for the first statement in the OR expression (that the
commitments cmt1, cmt2 are valid and consistent), and not the second (that x ∈ L).
If at some point during the interaction V∗ either aborts or fails in its WI proof, count it as an abort,
exit the loop and output V∗’s inner state (along with the instance x at the beginning).
If you exitted the loop because you ran for λ ·
⌈
1
a′(ρ)
⌉
iterations without an abort, halt and output
Fail.
We now turn to formally proving that the simulator runs in expected polynomial time and that
the transcripts it generates are computationally indistinguishable (by quantum adversaries) from the
transcripts generated by the malicious verifier’s real interaction with P. In some parts of the proof,
specifically, the proof that the simulator indeed runs in expected polynomial time (Claim 3.3) and also
the proof that the simulator fails to simulate only with a negligible probability (Claim 3.6), we do an
analysis similar to [GK96a], adapted to our setting.
Claim 3.3 (Simulator Runs in Expected Polynomial Time). There’s a fixed polynomial q(·) such that for
every verifier V∗ = {V∗λ}λ∈N, and arbitrary distribution ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N, the expected running time of the
simulation Sim(V∗λ, Oρλ) is q(|V
∗
λ|).
Proof. Denote the following probabilities:
• a(ρ) : the probability that V∗(ρ(x)) (after sampling (x, ρ(x)) ← ρ) aborts or fails in its WI proof
(for simplicity, we refer to this scenario simply as "abort") in the standard simulation, that is, a
single iteration of the process described in step 1 of the abort simulation.
• b(ρ) : (will be used in later claims) the probability that V∗(ρ(x)) aborts or fails in its WI proof
(also here, we refer to this scenario as "abort") in the abort simulation, that is, a single iteration
of the process described in step 2 of the abort simulation.
• c(ρ) : (will be used in later claims) the probability that V∗(ρ(x)) aborts or fails in its WI proof
(also here, we refer to this scenario as "abort") in the real interaction with the honest prover.
Denote by T (V∗, ρ) the running time of the simulator on input V∗λ with state ρλ, and by T
′(V∗, ρ) the
running time of the subroutine SimAbort on the same input, thus,
E [T (V∗, ρ)] = (1− a(ρ)) · poly(λ) + a(ρ) · E[T ′(V∗, ρ)] ,
for some polynomial poly(·) that denotes the running time of the simulator when it does not get aborts
from V∗λ (this polynomial depends on the circuit size of V
∗
λ, which is also a polynomial in λ).
Recall that the first step of SimAbort is to get λ2 aborts in the standard simulation (or score 2λ
iterations), thus the expected number of iterations in this step is λ
2
a(ρ) , and expected running time is
λ2
a(ρ) · poly(λ) (note that if our control path has made it to SimAbort, then a(ρ) > 0).
Observe that the expected running time of the second part of SimAbort is bounded by
Pr
[
a′(ρ) ∈
[
1
2
· a(ρ),
3
2
· a(ρ)
]]
·
3λ
a(ρ)
· poly(λ) + Pr
[
a′(ρ) /∈
[
1
2
· a(ρ),
3
2
· a(ρ)
]]
· 2O(λ) ,
thus it will be enough to show that the probability Pr
[
a′(ρ) /∈
[
1
2 · a(ρ),
3
2 · a(ρ)
]]
is sufficiently small6.
We have,
Pr
[
a′(ρ) /∈
[
1
2
· a(ρ),
3
2
· a(ρ)
]]
= Pr
[
a′(ρ) <
1
2
· a(ρ)
]
+Pr
[
a′(ρ) >
3
2
· a(ρ)
]
,
6For the current claim, it will in fact be enough to only show that Pr
[
a′(ρ) < 1
2
· a(ρ)
]
is sufficiently small, but we’ll use
the full case later so it will be beneficial to prove it now.
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and we use Chernoff bounds:
Pr
[
a′(ρ) <
1
2
· a(ρ)
]
=
(a′(ρ)=λ
2
N
)
Pr
[
2λ2
a(ρ)
< N
]
≤ Pr
[
X ≤ λ2
]
≤
(∗)
e−
λ2
4 ,
where (∗) follows from using the Chernoff tail bound Pr [X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ e−µ·δ
2· 1
2 , with X being the
number of aborts in the experiment of running the simulation 2λ
2
a(ρ) times, the expectation of X is 2λ
2,
and δ is 12 .
By similar reasoning it can be easily verified that,
Pr
[
a′(ρ) >
3
2
· a(ρ)
]
= Pr
[
N <
2
3 · λ
2
a(ρ)
]
≤ Pr
[
X ≥ (1 +
1
2
)
2
3
· λ2
]
≤ e−
λ2
15 ,
using the Chernoff tail bound Pr [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−
δ2
2+δ
µ
.
We now start the proof of the simulation’s validity which will be broken down into four parts:
1. We prove that the view in successful interactions (where the verifier does not abort or fail to prove
its WI statement) is indistinguishable from the view in successful simulations, where there was no
need to simulate an abort with SimAbort.
2. We prove that the view in aborting interactions (where the verifier in fact does abort or fail to prove
its WI statement) is indistinguishable from the view in abort simulations by SimAbort.
3. We prove that the simulator’s probability to fail in simulating the view (i.e. to output Fail) is
negligible.
4. Finally, using the above three claims, we prove that the (entire) simulated view is computationally
indistinguishable from the real view.
Claim 3.4 (Computational Indistinguishability of Non-Aborting Part). Let Sim⊥ be a simulation al-
gorithm that acts like Sim, but if V∗ aborts or fails in its WI proof, then it just outputs ⊥ (instead of
executing SimAbort). Let OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉S be the process of interaction between the honest prover and
V∗, s.t. if V∗ aborts or fails in the WI proof, the process outputs ⊥. Then, for every verifier V∗ and
instance-advice distribution ρ,
{OUTV∗
λ
〈P(wλ),V
∗
λ(ρ
(x))〉S(x)|(x, ρ
(x))← ρλ}λ∈N ≈c {Sim⊥(V
∗
λ, ρλ)}λ∈N .
Proof. First, we would like to note that the process Sim⊥ does not need an oracle access Oρ but only
one sample ρ, because it does not need to simulate aborts (which is the only part that needs the oracle
access).
We prove the claim by a hybrid argument, specifically, we consider intermediate (hybrid) simulation
processes, each consecutive pair can be shown to be computationally indistinguishable.
• Sim
(1)
⊥ : For an instance-advice distribution ρ, this process gets the witness w ∈ RL(x) and acts
exactly like Sim⊥, with the exception that when it gives a WI proof in step 5 of the simulation, it
uses the witness w for the second statement that says x ∈ L.
• Sim
(2)
⊥ : This process acts like Sim
(1)
⊥ , with the exception that cmt1 is a commitment to w rather
than to 0|w|.
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• Sim
(3)
⊥ : This process acts like Sim
(2)
⊥ , with the exception that if the verifier’s message β from part
3b of the simulation does not match the extracted β′ from part 2(b)iii of the simulation, the process
halts and outputs ⊥.
• Sim
(4)
⊥ : Acts like Sim
(3)
⊥ , with the exception that on parts 3a, 5, instead of computing α, γ through
Σ.S, we compute α← Σ.P(x,w) and γ = Σ.P(x,w;α, β).
• Sim
(5)
⊥ :Acts like Sim
(4)
⊥ , with the exception that it does not perform the check described in Sim
(3)
⊥ .
• Sim
(6)
⊥ : Acts like Sim
(5)
⊥ , with the exception that cmt2 is a commitment to 0
|dk| instead of to dk.
• Sim
(7)
⊥ : Acts like Sim
(6)
⊥ , with the exception that instead of performing the extraction procedure
described in step 2b of the simulation, if the verifier’s message at step 2a was explainable and in
particular ctV is indeed aQHE encryption of some t ∈ {0, 1}
λ (which can be checked inefficiently),
then at step 2b, the simulator sends SFE.Encdk(t), and otherwise acts like Sim
(6)
⊥ . The interaction
continues regularly without extraction.
• Sim
(8)
⊥ : Acts like Sim
(7)
⊥ , with the exception that instead of performing the inefficient check on
the verifier’s message from step 2a (and then sending SFE.Encdk(t)), the simulator just sends
SFE.Encdk(0
λ) at step 2b.
• Sim
(9)
⊥ : Acts like Sim
(8)
⊥ , with the exception that cmt2 is again a commitment to dk, rather than to
0|dk|. Observe that this process is exactly OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉S .
We now turn to explaining why each pair of consecutive distributions are computationally in-
distinguishable (and also why Sim⊥ ≈c Sim
(1)
⊥ ). We note that by the transitivity of computational
indistinguishability, this finishes our proof.
• Sim⊥ ≈c Sim
(1)
⊥ : Follows from the witness-indistinguishability property of the WI proof that the
simulator gives in step 5.
• Sim
(1)
⊥ ≈c Sim
(2)
⊥ : Follows from the hiding property of the non-interactive commitment cmt1.
• Sim
(2)
⊥ ≈s Sim
(3)
⊥ : These two distributions are in fact statistically indistinguishable. Note that the
only difference between the distributions is the transcripts from Sim
(2)
⊥ where β 6= β
′, but were not
erased by a failedWI proof. This means that either the verifier’s transcript was not explainable (but
still made it through the WI proof), or there was an error in the quantum homormorphic evaluation
(because correctness of both SFE and CC obfuscation is perfect). Both scenarios happen only
with a negligible probability, and thus the erasure of such cases creates only a negligible statistical
distance between the distributions.
• Sim
(3)
⊥ ≈c Sim
(4)
⊥ : Follows from the special zero-knowledge property of the sigma protocol.
• Sim
(4)
⊥ ≈s Sim
(5)
⊥ : Also here there’s more generally, a statistical indistinguishability, by the same
reasoning that explains why distributions Sim
(2)
⊥ and Sim
(3)
⊥ are statistically indistinguishable.
• Sim
(5)
⊥ ≈c Sim
(6)
⊥ : Follows from the hiding property of the non-interactive commitment cmt2.
• Sim
(6)
⊥ ≈s Sim
(7)
⊥ : Follows from the perfect correctness of the SFE and CC obfuscation, and the
fact that the QHE evaluation is statistically correct for every pair (pk, sk) ∈ QHE.Keygen.
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• Sim
(7)
⊥ ≈c Sim
(8)
⊥ : This indistinguishability follows from the input privacy property of the SFE
encryption.
• Sim
(8)
⊥ ≈c Sim
(9)
⊥ : Here we use the hiding property of the non-interactive commitment cmt2.
Note that the above claim in particular implies that the probailities not to abort in both processes (or
alternatively, probabilities to abort) are negligibly close.
Corollary 3.1 (a(ρ) and c(ρ) are Negligibly Close). Let ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N be any sequence of instance-advice
distributions, then there’s a negligible function µ(·) s.t. ∀λ ∈ N : |a(ρλ)− c(ρλ)| ≤ µ(λ).
Claim 3.5 (Computational Indistinguishability of Aborting Part). Let SimAbort⊥ be an abort-simulation
algorithm that acts exactly like executing only part 2 of SimAbort, but running only one iteration of it,
and if there’s no abort (i.e. the verifier gets to the end of the prover’s WI proof without any aborts, and
also succeeded in its own WI proof), it outputs ⊥. Let OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉A be the process of interaction
between the honest prover and V∗, s.t. if V∗ finishes the interaction successfully until the end of the
prover’s WI proof, the process outputs ⊥. Then, for every verifier V∗ and instance-advice distribution ρ,
{OUTV∗
λ
〈P(wλ),V
∗
λ(ρ
(x))〉A(x)|(x, ρ
(x))← ρλ}λ∈N ≈c {SimAbort⊥(V
∗
λ, ρλ)}λ∈N .
Proof. The proofwill take a very similar route as the proof of Claim3.4. We consider hybrid distributions,
all of which will be computationally indistinguishable.
• SimAbort
(1)
⊥ : This process gets the witness w ∈ RL(x) (all next processes to come also get w)
and acts exactly like SimAbort⊥, with the exception that when it gives a WI proof in step 5 of the
protocol, it uses the witness w for the second statement that says x ∈ L.
• SimAbort
(2)
⊥ : Acts exactly like SimAbort
(1)
⊥ , with the exception that cmt1 is a commitment to w
rather than to 0|w|.
• SimAbort
(3)
⊥ : Acts exactly like SimAbort
(2)
⊥ , with the exception that the message α at step 3a
is generated by the sigma protocol α ← Σ.P(x,w), and not by the first-message simulator
α← Σ.S1(x, 0
λ) (from claim 2.1). Note that this process is exactly OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉A.
It’s left to reason about the indistinguishabilities between each pair.
• SimAbort⊥ ≈c SimAbort
(1)
⊥ : Follows from the witness-indistinguishability property of the WI
proof that the simulator gives (as the prover) in step 5 of the protocol.
• SimAbort
(1)
⊥ ≈c SimAbort
(2)
⊥ : Follows from the hiding property of the commitment cmt1.
• SimAbort
(2)
⊥ ≈c SimAbort
(3)
⊥ : Follows from Claim 2.1.
Note that the above claim in particular implies that the probailities to abort in both processes (or
alternatively, probabilities not to abort) are negligibly close.
Corollary 3.2 (b(ρ) and c(ρ) are Negligibly Close). Let ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N be any sequence of instance-advice
distributions, then there’s a negligible function µ(·) s.t. ∀λ ∈ N : |b(ρλ)− c(ρλ)| ≤ µ(λ).
We thus conclude that a(·), b(·), c(·) are all negligibly close to each other.
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Claim 3.6 (The Simulation Almost Always Succeeds). Let V∗ = {V∗λ}λ∈N be a quantum verifier and
let ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N be an instance-advice distribution, then there’s a negligible function µ s.t. for every
λ ∈ N:
Pr [Sim(V∗λ, Oρλ) = Fail] ≤ µ(λ) .
Proof. We have,
Pr [Sim(V∗λ, Oρλ) = Fail] =
a(ρλ) · (Pr [SimAbort Failed in its first part] + Pr [SimAbort Failed in its second part]) , (1)
and we start with showing that the first probability is exponentially small.
Pr [SimAbort Failed in its first part] =
λ2−1∑
i=0
Pr
[
There were exactly 2λ − i fails out of 2λ tries
]
. (2)
Now, recall that the probability to abort in a try (i.e. to succeed in a try) inside the first step of SimAbort
is a(ρ), and consider two cases.
• a(ρ) ≤ 1/2 : Thus the sum from 2 is bounded by
λ2 · Pr
[
There were 2λ fails
]
= λ2 · (1− a(x))2
λ
,
and by considering the multiplicative factor a(ρ) (from 1) we can split to two cases (e.g. a(ρ) ≤
2−λ/2 and a(ρ) > 2−λ/2) and show that (in both cases) when the above probability is multiplied
by a(ρ), it is bounded by 2−Ω(λ).
• a(ρ) > 1/2 : thus the sum from 2 is bounded by
λ2 · Pr
[
There were exactly 2λ − λ2 fails
]
= λ2 ·
(
2λ
2λ − λ2
)
· (1− a(ρ))2
λ−λ2 · a(ρ)λ
2
≤
λ2 · 2λ
3
· (1− a(ρ))2
λ−λ2 < λ2 · 2λ
3
· 2−2
λ+λ2 ≤ 2−Ω(2
λ) .
It is left to show that the probability to fail in the second step is also negligible, and we calculate.
Pr [SimAbort Failed in its second part] ≤ Pr
[
There were
λ
a′(ρ)
failed trials
]
≤
Pr
[
There were
λ
a′(ρ)
failed trials
∣∣∣∣ a′(ρ) ∈ [12 · a(ρ), 32 · a(ρ)
]]
+Pr
[
a′(ρ) /∈
[
1
2
· a(ρ),
3
2
· a(ρ)
]]
.
As a part of the proof of claim 3.3, we saw that Pr
[
a′(ρ) /∈
[
1
2 · a(ρ),
3
2 · a(ρ)
]]
≤ e−Ω(λ
2), so we only
need to bound the first probability.
Pr
[
There were
λ
a′(ρ)
failed trials
∣∣∣∣ a′(ρ) ∈ [12 · a(ρ), 32 · a(ρ)
]]
≤
Pr
[
There were
2λ
3a(ρ)
failed trials
]
= (1− b(ρ))
2λ
3a(ρ) ≤ e
− b(ρ)
a(ρ)
· 2
3
·λ
.
Assume towards contradiction that there is some noticeable probability ε(λ) = λ−O(1) s.t. for
infinitely many λ ∈ N, we have,
ε(λ) ≤ a(ρλ) · Pr
[
There were
λ
a′(ρλ)
failed trials
∣∣∣∣ a′(ρλ) ∈ [12 · a(ρλ), 32 · a(ρλ)
]]
.
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Thus,
ε(λ) ≤ a(ρλ) · e
−
b(ρλ)
a(ρλ)
· 2
3
·λ
.
Now, we saw that a(ρ) and b(ρ) are negligibly close, and the last equation implies that a(ρ) is a
noticeable function (that is, a(ρλ) is a noticeable function of λ ∈ N). These two properties together imply
that (for large values ofλ) we have b(ρλ)a(ρλ) ∈ [
1
2 , 2], in contradiction to the inequality ε(λ) ≤ e
− b(x)
a(x)
· 2
3
·λ
.
We conclude with showing that the simulation is successful.
Lemma 3.2. Let V∗ = {V∗λ}λ∈N be a quantum verifier and let ρ = {ρλ}λ∈N be an instance-advice
distribution, then,
{x,OUTV∗λ〈P(wλ),V
∗
λ(ρ
(x)
λ )〉(x) | (x, ρ
(x)
λ )← ρλ}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(V
∗
λ, Oρλ)}λ∈N .
Proof. Denote the following distributions.
• SSim = {SSim,λ}λ∈N : A conditional distribution of Sim⊥(V
∗, ρ), conditioned on that the output
is not ⊥ (might be an empty distribution, if a(ρ) = 1).
• ASim = {ASim,λ}λ∈N : A conditional distribution of SimAbort⊥(V
∗, ρ), conditioned on that the
output is not ⊥ (might be an empty distribution, if b(ρ) = 0).
Now, consider the distribution that with probability 1 − a(ρ) samples from SSim, and with probability
a(ρ) samples from ASim - denote this distribution by SimNo-Fail(V
∗, ρ) (we do not claim nothing about
the efficiency of such process).
Note that by Claim 3.6, SimNo-Fail(V
∗, ρ) is statistically indistinguishable from the output distribution
of Sim(V∗, Oρ). This follows from three facts: (1) the (original) simulator fails only with negligible
probability, (2) the verifier succeeds in themain simulation (andSimAbort isn’t executed)with probability
1 − a(ρ), and then the output distribution is exactly SSim, (3) the verifier aborts or fails in its WI proof
and we arrive to SimAbort with probability a(ρ), and then if the simulation does not fail, the output
distribution is exactly ASim. It thus remains to show that SimNo-Fail is computationally indistinguishable
from the distribution of the real interaction.
We define two more conditional distributions.
• S〈P,V∗〉 = {S〈P,V∗〉,λ}λ∈N : A conditional distribution of OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉S , conditioned on that the
output is not ⊥ (might be an empty distribution, if c(ρ) = 1).
• A〈P,V∗〉 = {A〈P,V∗〉,λ}λ∈N : A conditional distribution of OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉A, conditioned on that
the output is not ⊥ (might be an empty distribution, if c(ρ) = 0).
Similarly to the proofs of claims 3.4, 3.5, we define hybrid distributions, and show in steps why each
consecutive pair of distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
• Sim
(1)
No-Fail : Like SimNo-Fail, except that with probability 1− a(ρ) it samples from S〈P,V∗〉 instead
from SSim.
• Sim
(2)
No-Fail : Like Sim
(1)
No-Fail, except that with probability a(ρ) it samples from A〈P,V∗〉 instead from
ASim.
• Sim
(3)
No-Fail : Like Sim
(2)
No-Fail, except that it samples from A〈P,V∗〉 with probability c(ρ) instead of
probability a(ρ) (and thus also samples from S〈P,V∗〉 with probability 1−c(ρ) instead of 1−a(ρ)).
Observe that this distribution is exactly OUTV∗〈P,V
∗(ρ(x))〉(x), (x, ρ(x))← ρ.
29
It is left to explain why each consecutive pair of distributions are computationally indistinguishable,
and then by the transitivity of computational indistinguishability, our proof is finished.
• SimNo-Fail ≈c Sim
(1)
No-Fail : Assume towards contradiction there’s an efficient quantum distinguisher
D∗ and a noticeable probability ǫ(λ) s.t. for an infinite subsequence Q ⊆ N, for every λ ∈ Q, we
have, ∣∣∣Pr[D∗(SimNo-Fail(V∗λ, ρλ)) = 1]− Pr[D∗(Sim(1)No-Fail(V∗λ, ρλ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ(λ).
Consider two cases.
– There’s an infinite subsequence Q′ ⊆ Q and a negligible function µ s.t. a(ρλ) ≤ µ(λ) for
all λ ∈ Q′.
In that case, the contradiction follows directly from Claim 3.4.
– Otherwise, there’s an infinite subsequence Q′ ⊆ Q where a(ρλ) is noticeable for all indices
insideQ′. This implies that for these indices we can sample fromASim in polynomial time and
overwhelming probability of success in sampling. The last fact implies in turn that we can still
use Claim 3.4 to get a contradiction in the following manner: We reduce distinguishability of
non-aborting parts to distinguishability between SimNo-Fail and Sim
(1)
No-Fail, by getting a sample
from either Sim⊥ or OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉S , and if we got ⊥, then we sample (with overwhelming
probability of success) from ASim. If the sample was from Sim⊥, then the output sample
of the reduction is from a distribution that’s statistically indistinguishable from SimNo-Fail,
and if the sample came from OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉S , then the reduction output is sample from a
distribution which is statistically indistinguishable from Sim
(1)
No-Fail.
• Sim
(1)
No-Fail ≈c Sim
(2)
No-Fail : Assume towards contradiction there’s an efficient quantum distinguisher
D∗ and a noticeable probability ǫ(λ) s.t. for an infinite subsequence Q ⊆ N, for every λ ∈ Q, we
have, ∣∣∣Pr[D∗(Sim(1)No-Fail(V∗λ, ρλ)) = 1]− Pr[D∗(Sim(2)No-Fail(V∗λ, ρλ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ(λ).
Consider two cases.
– There’s an infinite subsequence Q′ ⊆ Q and a negligible function µ s.t. 1 − c(ρλ) ≤ µ(λ)
for all λ ∈ Q′.
In that case, the contradiction follows directly from Claim 3.5.
– Otherwise, there’s an infinite subsequenceQ′ ⊆ Qwhere1−c(ρλ) is noticeable for all indices
inside Q′. This implies that for these indices we can sample from S〈P,V∗〉 in polynomial time
and overwhelming probability of success in sampling. The last fact implies in turn that
we can still use Claim 3.5 to get a contradiction in the following manner: We reduce
distinguishability of aborting parts to distinguishability between Sim
(1)
No-Fail and Sim
(2)
No-Fail,
by getting a sample from either SimAbort⊥ or OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉A, and if we got ⊥, then we
sample (with overwhelming probability of success) from S〈P,V∗〉. If the sample was from
SimAbort⊥, then the output sample of the reduction is from a distribution that’s statistically
indistinguishable from Sim
(1)
No-Fail, and if the sample came from OUTV∗〈P,V
∗〉A, then the
reduction output is sample from a distribution which is statistically indistinguishable from
Sim
(2)
No-Fail.
• Sim
(2)
No-Fail ≈s Sim
(3)
No-Fail : These two distributions are also statistically indistinguishable, which
follows from the fact that a(ρ) and c(ρ) are negligibly close (Corollary 3.1).
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4 Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Quantum Arguments for QMA
In this section, we show how to use our constant-round ZK argument in order to construct constant-
round ZK quantum arguments for QMA, that is, honest parties are efficient and quantum (prover is
efficient given a quantum witness), and communication is also quantum. In [BJSW16], Broadbent, Ji,
Song and Watrous construct a constant-round zero-knowledge quantum protocol for QMA with constant
soundness. They then perform a polynomial sequential repetition of that protocol to get a proof system
(with negligible soundness) with polynomially many rounds.
The authors also note that a parallel repetition of their (core, constant-round) protocol can be used to
obtain a constant-round zero-knowledge quantum protocol for QMA, given two tools:
• A fully-simulatable constant-round coin-flipping protocol for polynomially-many bits.
• A constant-round zero-knowledge protocol for NP.
In section 3 we constructed a constant-round argument for NP and in this section (using our zero-
knowledge protocol) we construct the required coin-flipping protocol.
Next, we formally define a zero-knowledge quantum argument system for QMA, and then state our
result regarding QMA.
Definition 4.1 (Zero-Knowledge Quantum Argument for QMA). A quantum protocol (P,V) with an
honest QPT prover P and an honest QPT verifier V for a language L ∈ QMA is a quantum-secure
zero-knowledge argument if it satisfies:
1. Statistical Completeness: There is some negligible function µ(·) s.t. for any λ ∈ N, x ∈
L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x)7,
Pr[OUTV〈P(w),V〉(x) = 1] ≥ 1− µ(λ) .
2. Quantum Computational Soundness: For any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size prover
P∗ = {P∗λ}λ∈N, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for any security parameter λ ∈ N
and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [OUTV〈P
∗
λ,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
3. Quantum Computational Zero-Knowledge: There exists a quantum expected polynomial-time
simulator Sim, such that for any non-uniform quantum polynomial-size verifier V∗ = {V∗λ}λ∈N,
{OUTV∗
λ
〈P(w),V∗λ〉(x)} λ∈N,
x∈L∩{0,1}λ ,
w∈RL(x)
≈c {Sim(x,V
∗
λ)} λ∈N,
x∈L∩{0,1}λ,
w∈RL(x)
.
We note that like in the case of NP, the stronger (quantumly-semi-composable) version of the zero-
knowledge definition is proven by practically the same proof, but for the sake of simplicity (and because
we don’t actually use the ZK argument for QMA in this work, only construct it), we stay with the simpler
definition.
We now turn to the definition of constant-round fully-simulatable coin-flipping protocol, where the
simulation is in the same quantum-semi-composable sense as the zero-knowledge guarantee for the
argument from section 3.
7For a language L in QMA, for an instance x ∈ L in the language, the set RL(x) is the (possily infinite) set of quantum
witnesses that make the BQP verification machine accept with some probability negligibly close to 1.
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Definition 4.2 (2-Party Coin-Flipping Protocol with QSC Full Simulation of Party A). A 2-party coin-
flipping protocol (with full simulation of party A) is given by two classical algorithms (A,B) with joint
input 1λ, 1k(λ), and joint output r ∈ {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} (which can be efficiently computed from the protocol
transcript), with the following randomness guarantee:
• Computational Randomness Guarantee for A: Let B∗ = {B∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N be a polynomial-size
quantum adversary. Let pλ be the probability that the protocol ends with a non-⊥ output when
A interacts with B∗λ, and let (p, Uk) be the distribution that with probability 1 − p outputs ⊥
and with probability p outputs a sample from Uk. Then, the protocol output r is computationally
indistinguishable from {(pλ, Uk(λ))}λ∈N (where k(λ) is a polynomial).
• Strong Randomness Guarantee for B (Full QSC Simulation of Party A): There exists a
quantum expected polynomial-time simulator Sim, such that for any quantum polynomial-size
adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N,
{VIEWA∗
λ
〈A∗(ρλ),B〉(1
λ, 1k(λ))}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(r,A
∗
λ, Oρλ) | r← Uk(λ)}λ∈N ,
where,
– VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉 includes (1) the output r ∈ {0, 1}k∪{⊥} of the protocol, (2) the protocol
transcript, and (3) the inner quantum state of A∗ at the end of interaction (whether it ended
successfully or not).
– For the "protocol output" part of its simulation output, Sim(r,A∗λ, Oρλ) always outputs either
r or ⊥.
– Oρ is an inputless oracle that upon activation returns a copy of the quantum state ρ.
We now can state our result regarding QMA.
Theorem 4.1. Given the existence of constant-round QSC zero-knowledge arguments for NP, and
constant-round coin-flipping protocols with QSC Full Simulation, there exists constant-round zero-
knowledge quantum arguments for QMA.
The construction and proof of the QMA protocol appear in [BJSW16] and are omitted here. The
only change in the proof from [BJSW16] is that our coin-flipping and zero-knowledge NP protocols
simulations are quantumly-semi-composable, rather then fully composable. This only makes the proof
less modular. In our fully-simulatable coin-flipping protocol we demonstrate how to use the semi-
composable definition.
We move to present the fully-simulatable coin-flipping protocol.
Ingredients and notation:
• A non-interactive commitment scheme Com.
• A 2-message function-hiding secure function evaluation scheme (SFE.Gen, SFE.Enc, SFE.Eval,
SFE.Dec).
• A constant-round QSC zero-knowledge argument system (PNP,VNP) for NP.
HandlingAborts andAlikes. Like in previous sections, we set a convention to handle publicly checkable
misbehaviors by the parties in the protocol.
• For a security parameter λ, for each message in the protocol, it is known (publicly) based on λ,
what is the length of each message (or upper and lower bounds on that length). If a party sends a
message in an incorrect length, the receiving party fixes it locally and trivially; if the message is
too long, it cuts the message in a suitable place, and if it’s too short then pads with zeros.
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• In the below protocol, whenever a party aborts, the other party ends communication, and the output
of the protocol is ⊥. The output of the protocol is ⊥ also if either of the parties fail to prove their
arguments in steps 2 and 5 below.
We describe the protocol in Figure 2.
Protocol 2
Common Input: A security parameter λ ∈ N and a number k ∈ N of wanted random coins, both
given in unary 1λ, 1k.
1. Initial Commitment by B: B sends a commitment to 0: cmtB ← Com(1
λ, 0).
2. ZK Argument by B: B interacts with A through (PNP,VNP) to give a ZK argument that
cmtB is indeed a commitment to 0, that is, there exists randomness r0 ∈ {0, 1}
poly(λ,1)a s.t.
cmtB = Com(1
λ, 0; r0).
3. A Commits to Coins: A chooses k random coins a← Uk and sends a commitment for them
cmtA ← Com(1
λ, a).
4. A Challenges B: The parties interact so that A can offer to send a if B managed to trick A in
the ZK argument.
(a) B computes dk← SFE.Gen(1λ) and sends ctB ← SFE.Encdk(0
poly(λ,1)).
(b) A sends cˆt ← SFE.Eval
(
C1→a, ctB
)
, where C1→a is the (canonical) circuit that for
input r1 ∈ {0, 1}
poly(λ,1) s.t. cmtB = Com(1
λ, 1; r1), outputs a, and for any other
input outputs ⊥.
5. ZK Argument by A: A interacts with B through (PNP,VNP) to give a ZK argument for the
statement that its transcript until the end of step 4b is explainable.
6. Both Parties Reveal Coins: B computes b← Uk and sends it to A. A responds with sending
a along with an opening of the commitment cmtA. If the opening does not open cmtA to a,
protocol output is ⊥.
7. Output: The output of the protocol is r = a⊕ b.
aLet poly(λ, ℓ) denote the polynomial that represents the amount of randomness the commitment algorithm Com(·)
needs for security parameter λ and message length ℓ.
Figure 2: A constant-round coin-flipping protocol with full simulation of party A and quantum security.
4.1 Randomness Guarantee for A
We prove the (computational) randomness guarantee for party A, which basically says that for any
efficient quantum attacker B, the output distribution of the protocol is computationally indistinguishable
from one where the protocol output is a truly random string (considering the aborting probability 1− p
of the attacker).
Claim 4.1. Protocol 2 has a computational randomness guarantee for A.
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Proof. Let B∗ = {B∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N be a quantum polynomial-size adversary (and let k(λ) be a polynomial
that denotes the number of output bits in the protocol, for security parameter λ ∈ N), and denote by rλ
the random variable in {0, 1}k(λ) ∪ {⊥} that is the output of the interaction between A and B∗(ρλ), and
by pλ the probability the protocol ends with a non-⊥ output when A interacts with B
∗
λ(ρλ). We prove
that
{rλ}λ∈N ≈c {(pλ, Uk(λ))}λ∈N .
We can assume w.l.o.g. that B∗(ρ) always sends the same first message, and the reason is as follows:
Consider the distribution D over the first message cmtB∗ of B
∗(ρ), and for a message cmtB∗ denote by
qcmtB∗ the probability that the protocol ends with a non-⊥ output when A interacts with B
∗, when the
first message of B∗ was cmtB∗ . The reasoning is finished by the following steps:
• Recall that EcmtB∗←D
[
qcmtB∗
]
= p.
• Furthermore, note that the following distribution is identical to the distribution (p, Uk): Sample
cmtB∗ ← D and output a sample from (qcmtB∗ , Uk).
• Denote by D∗ a distinguisher that tells the difference between the protocol’s output and (p, Uk).
Thus,
|Pr [D∗(r) = 1]− Pr [D∗(p, Uk) = 1]| =∣∣EcmtB∗←D [Pr [D∗(rcmtB∗ ) = 1]− Pr [D∗(qcmtB∗ , Uk) = 1]]∣∣ ,
where rcmtB∗ is the random variable that denotes the protocol’s output conditioned that the first
message of B∗ is cmtB∗ .
• Finally, we can consider the sample cmt′B∗ and inner quantum state ρ
(1) s.t. the gap inside the
expectation is maximized, and assume that B∗ always uses this pair (as B∗ can use n.u. quantum
advice).
We furthermore add w.l.o.g. the assumption that the first message of B∗, cmtB∗ , is not only
deterministic, but indeed is a commitment to 0. If it wasn’t the case that cmtB∗ commits to 0, then by
the soundness of the argument that B∗ gives at step 2 of the protocol, the argument will fail to convince
A with overwhelming probability and protocol output r is ⊥, this means that p is negligibly close to 1
and that the distributions r and (p, Uk) are statistically indistinguishable, and our proof is finished.
Now, note that the distribution {rλ}λ is exactly the distribution that’s generated by the following
process: A and B∗(ρ) interact regularly (as usual, if there is an abort by B∗ or that it fails in its argument
in step 2, output is ⊥), and once B∗ sends b at step 6, the process output is a⊕ b.
We claim that the last process is computationally indistinguishable from the following: A(0k)8 and
B∗(ρ) interact regularly, and when B∗ sends its string b, the process chooses at random a ← Uk and
outputs a⊕ b.
In a nutshell, the reason that the last two distributions are computationally indistinguishable is that
the string a that A commits to in step 3 is hidden from computationally bounded quantum adversaries.
More precisely, the last informal claim is captured formally in Claim 4.2. It’s easy to verify that given
Claim 4.2 and an averaging argument over a, the above indistinguishability is proved.
We note that the last distribution is exactly (p0, Uk), where p0 is the probability that B
∗(ρ) aborts
when interacting with A(0k). Finally, observe that (p0, Uk) is statistically indistinguishable from (p, Uk)
(recall that p is the probability for B∗(ρ) to abort when interacting with A), and this follows from the fact
that p and p0 are negligibly close, which is also implied by Claim 4.2.
8For a string a′ ∈ {0, 1}k, A(a′) denotes the process A s.t. the string a that it commits to in step 3 is a′.
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Claim 4.2 (A’s coins are hidden). For a string s ∈ {0, 1}k , let VIEWB∗〈A(s),B
∗(ρ)〉 be the distribution
over the transcript and inner quantum state of B∗ at the end of step 5, generated in the process of
interaction between A(s) and B∗(ρ). Then, for every two k(λ)-length strings {s0,λ}λ∈N, {s1,λ}λ∈N:
{VIEWB∗〈A(s0,λ),B
∗
λ(ρλ)〉(1
λ, 1k(λ))}λ∈N ≈c {VIEWB∗〈A(s1,λ),B
∗
λ(ρλ)〉(1
λ, 1k(λ))}λ∈N .
Proof. Define the following hybrid distributions on transcripts.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1) : Acts like the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉, except that in step 5,
instead of A communicating with B∗ to give a ZK argument, we take the ZK simulator SimNP
and use it to simulate the argument by A. The instance-advice distribution (x, ρ(x)) ← σ that the
simulator will have oracle access to, is the conditional distribution on protocol transcript (x) and
inner state of B∗ that is generated by the interaction between A(s0) and B
∗(ρ) until the end of step
4b (ρ(x)), conditioned that the transcript is successful so far (no aborts or argument fails from B∗).
We further describe the operation of the process: It has oracle access Oρ to the quantum advice ρ
of B∗, and if it gets to step 5 and needs to simulate, it will use the generated transcript as instance
and inner state of B∗ as the advice, and every time the simulator needs another sample, the process
VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1) restarts, samples from Oρ and generates a transcript and inner state of
B∗ such that the transcript is successful - this might take many tries, but the process will keep on
trying until it gets a successful transcript (if we managed to get to step 5 once, the probability to
sample a transcript that’s successful until that step, is non-zero).
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2) : Acts like the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1), except that in step
4b, instead of actually performing an SFE evaluation of C1→s0 , the process performs an SFE
evaluation of the circuit C⊥ that always outputs ⊥.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(3) : Acts like the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2), except that in step 3,
instead of committing to s0, A commits to s1.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(4) : Acts like the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(3), except that in step
4b, the process performs an SFE evaluation of the circuit C1→s1 , and not of the circuit C⊥.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(5) :Acts like the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(4), except that instead of
using the ZK simulator for A’s argument, the process is a regular communication between A(s1)
and B∗. Observe that this process is exactly VIEWB∗〈A(s1),B
∗(ρ)〉.
WenowexplainwhyVIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉 is computaionally indistinguishable fromVIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1),
and why each consecutive pair of distributions are computationally indistinguishable. By the transitivity
of computational indistinguisability, after we show the above, we are done.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉 ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1) :Follows from the quantumly-semi-composable
(QSC) ZK property of definition 3.3.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1) ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2) : As a short explanation, this indistin-
guishability follows fromperforming a cutoff on theZK simulator’s running time (which is expected
polynomial time), together with the circuit privacy property of the SFE encryption (that’s more
easily captured by Claim 2.2). As a longer explanation, we give the full reasoning which will be
used (but not written from scratch every time) in every of the following indistinguishabilities.
Assume towards contradiction that these distributions are distinguishable, and we describe a
process for distinguishing between SFE evaluations of C1→s0 and SFE evaluations of C⊥ which
according to Claim 2.2 are statistically indistinguishable because the two circuits have identical
functionality (recall we know that the commitment of B∗ is to 0, and because of its perfect binding,
there is no opening of the commitment to 1, and thus the circuit C1→s0 always outputs ⊥).
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– Identifying the ProcessesOperationExactly: For clarity, we start with explicitly describing
the operation processes of both VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1), VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2). Any
of the above processes start regularly, and if a process does not get to step 5 on the first try
and B∗ aborts somewhere along the way (or fails the ZK argument), the process terminates
regularly. However, if a process does make it to the simulation at step 5, then every time
the ZK simulator needs a fresh sample, the process "restarts": it erases the transcript so far,
samples ρ ← Oρ and tries to sample a new successful transcript - this might take a while,
because B∗ can abort somewhere between the restarting point of the process and restarting
point of simulation.
– Identifying Processes Expected Running Time as Polynomial: We would now like to
explainwhy both processes still run in expected polynomial time, evenwhen the probability of
B∗ to succeed is negligible. Let p1 be the probability that B
∗ succeeds to get to the simulation
part in the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1), from the point that we sample ρ ← Oρ (and
let p2 be the same probability for the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2)), then the average
number of tries until getting a successful transcript in the setting ofVIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1)
is 1/p1, which might be exponential. The catch is that we perform such repeated sampling
only when we already gotten a successful transcript once, which happens with probability
p1. More specifically, the expected running time of the procedure VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1)
is,
(1− p1) · poly(λ) + p1 · q(|B
∗|) ·
1
p1
· poly(λ) ≤ poly(λ) + q(|B∗|) · poly(λ) =: q′(λ) ,
where poly(λ) is a polynomial that denotes the running time of the protocol interaction
(executing the algorithms A and B∗ until the simulation part), and the number 1p1 · poly(λ)
thus denotes the expected running time to get a fresh sample for the ZK simulator, which
runs in expected time q(|B∗|). By similar reasoning, we obtain that the expected running
time of the process VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2) is also bounded by the polynomial q′(λ).
– Using the Distinguisher’s Advantage to Define Strinct Polynomial-Time Processes: A
distinguisher D∗ that tells the difference between the two processes above, distinguishes
with some noticeable probability ǫ(λ) (for infinitely many security parameters). We will
show how to turn the simulators to fixed polynomial-time ones that use a polynomial-size
quantum advice. Now, in either of the processes (whether we get an evaluation of C1→s0
or of C⊥), the expectation of the running time of the process is q
′(λ), where q′(·) is fixed
polynomial. By Markov’s inequality, the probability that the process’s running time exceeds
m(λ) := q′(λ) ·4 · 1ǫ is bounded by
ǫ
4 , and thus if we consider an alternative process that halts
after exceeding this time bound (and in particular doesn’t use oracle access Oρ to ρ samples,
but a fixed m(λ) samples of ρ), its output distribution has statistical distance bounded by ǫ4
to that of the original process.
– Observing that the Distinguisher Tells the Difference Between the Cutoff Processes: For
the distinguisher D∗ that tells the difference between the two original processes (that take
expected polynomial time to execute), the distinction advantage is at least ǫ, and thus, because
each of the cutoff processes is ǫ4 -close to its original version, the distinction advantage of D
∗
between the two cutoff processes is at least ǫ2 .
– Connecting the Processeswith aCryptographic SecurityGuarantee: Wenow connect the
distinguisher with the circuit privacy property of the SFE. Note that by Claim 2.2 and by the
fact that the circuits C1→s0 and of C⊥ have identical functionality, we can claim that for any
distribution D on (|φ〉, ct∗) where |φ〉 is a quantum state and ct∗ is a possibly invalid cipher-
text, the distributions (|φ〉, ct∗,SFE.Eval(C1→s0 , ct
∗)) and (|φ〉, ct∗,SFE.Eval(C⊥, ct
∗)) are
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also statistically indistinguishable, this is true by a simple averaging argument. The above
implies that for any polynomial number of independent samples of the abovementioned tu-
ples, evaluations of C1→s0 on samples from D and evaluations of C⊥ on samples from D
are still statistically indistinguishable, this can be verified by a hybrid argument.
In particular, consider the distributionD that samples a transcript and inner quantum state for
B∗ generated at the end of step 4a, that is, |φ〉 is the transcript and the inner quantum state of
B∗, not including the message ctB∗ from step 4a, and ct
∗ := ctB∗ , and if there was an abort
before step 4a in the interaction of that sample, define ct∗ := 0. m(λ) is a polynomial and
such number of samples is statistically indistinguishable - we show that we can distinguish,
in contradiction.
– Security Reduction: We describe a distinguisher D˜∗ that will use D∗: it gets a sample
(z1, z2, · · · , zm(λ)) which is either m(λ) tuples of evaluations of C1→s0 or of C⊥. If the
transcript in z1 is aborting we just giveD
∗ the transcript and inner state ofB∗ (this corresponds
to the scenario where B∗ aborted before we even got to the ZK simulation for the first time).
Otherwise, we initiate the ZK simulator and when it needs new sample from its instance-
advice oracle, then we use the rest of the samples z2, z3, · · · , zm(λ) to feed it. It can be verified
that when the tuples come from evaluations of C1→s0 then the transcripts that D˜
∗ generates
for D∗ come from the output distribution of the cutoff process of VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1),
and when tuples come from evaluations of C⊥ then the transcripts that D˜∗ generates for D
∗
come from the output distribution of the cutoff process of VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2). Thus
D∗ tells the difference with advantage ǫ2 and so does D˜
∗, in contradiction.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2) ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(3) : Follows from performing a cutoff on
the ZK simulator’s running time, together with the hiding of the commitment Com(·).
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(3) ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(4) : Similarly to the indistinguishability
VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(1) ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(2), this one follows from performing a
cutoff on the ZK simulator’s running time, together with the circuit privacy property of the SFE
encryption.
• VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(4) ≈c VIEWB∗〈A(s0),B
∗(ρ)〉(5) : Follows again from the QSC ZK prop-
erty of definition 3.3.
4.2 Full Simulation of Party A
We show a quantum expected polynomial-time simulator Sim s.t. for any polynomial-size quantum
adversary A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, simulates the protocol as described in definition 4.2.
Handling Aborts in Simulation. In the below simulation, if at any part of the simulation A∗ either
aborts, or fails in its argument statement (for messages of incorrect length, the simulator acts like B
and trivially corrects the length, as describe above the protocol) the simulator halts, outputs ⊥ as the
simulation coin-flipping output, the transcript so far as the simulation transcript output, and the inner
state of A∗ as the simulation adversary state output.
Sim(r,A∗, Oρ) :
1. Simulation of Initial Commitment: Sim samples ρ← Oρ and sets ρ to be the inner state of A
∗.
Sim then sends to A∗ a commitment to 1: cmtSim = Com(1
λ, 1; r1), where r1 ∈ {0, 1}
poly(λ,1) is
the random string used as the randomness of the commitment algorithm.
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2. B’s ZK Argument Simulation: Sim uses the argument’s ZK simulator SimNP to simulate for A
∗
the communication with B. It executes SimNP(A
∗, Oσ), where σ is the instance-advice distribution
(x, ρ(x)) that is generated s.t. x is a commitment to 1 by Sim (from step 1 of the simulation), and
ρ(x) is the inner state ρ of A
∗ at the beginning of the protocol.
3. Extraction Attempt from A∗:
• A∗ outputs cmtA∗ .
• Sim computes dk← SFE.Gen(1λ) and sends ctSim ← SFE.Encdk(r1).
• A∗ outputs a response cˆt.
Sim then decrypts the evaluated ciphertext to get a′.
4. ZK Argument by Malicious A∗: Sim takes the role of the honest B in the ZK argument A∗ gives.
5. Matching B’s Coins to A∗’s Coins: Sim sends b = a′ ⊕ r to A∗. A∗ sends back a and ra, Sim
verifies that ra indeed opens cmtA∗ to a, and thus decides if the output of the protocol is a⊕ b or
⊥. Finally, Sim outputs the inner state of A∗ along with the protocol output (either a⊕ b or⊥) and
transcript.
It is clear that given oracle access to copies of ρ, the expected running time of the simulator is poly-
nomial, as it performs polynomial-time computations plus executing the ZK argument simulator SimNP,
which also runs in expected polynomial time. It remains to explain why the above simulation process
yields an output that’s computationally indistinguishable from what’s generated in a real interaction
between A∗(ρ) and B.
Claim 4.3 (CF Simulator Output Validity). Let A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N be a polynomial-size quantum
adversary, then,
{VIEWA∗
λ
〈A∗(ρλ),B〉(1
λ, 1k(λ))}λ∈N ≈c {Sim(r,A
∗
λ, Oρλ) | r ← Uk(λ)}λ∈N .
Proof. Define the following hybrid processes:
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(1) : This process acts like the regular interaction VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉, except
that it has oracle access Oρ to the inner state ρ of A
∗, and in step 2, instead of executing the
argument between the parties, we take the ZK simulator SimNP to simulate A
∗’s view. To use the
simulator we need to define what is the instance-advice distribution (x, ρ(x)) ← σ, and let SimNP
have oracle access to Oσ.
– The distribution (x, ρ(x)) ← σ is the distribution on protocol transcript (x) and inner state
(ρ(x)) of A∗ that is generated by the interaction between A∗(ρ) and B until the end of step 1,
that is, x is a commitment to 0 by B, and ρ(x) is simply the inner state ρ of A∗ before protocol
starts.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(2) : Acts like VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(1), except that in step 1, B commits to 1
instead of to 0.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(3) : Acts like VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(2), except that in step 4a, B sends an SFE
encryption ctB of the randomness that it used in step 1 when it committed for 1.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(4) :Acts like VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(3), except that in step 6, B outputs b = a′⊕ r
for a random r ← Uk(λ), instead of a random string b ← Uk(λ). Observe that this distribution,
given the fact the r is sampled uniformly and is not used in the process before this last step, is
exactly {Sim(r,A∗λ, Oρλ) | r ← Uk(λ)}.
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WenowexplainwhyVIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉 is computationally indistinguishable fromVIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(1),
and why each consecutive pair of distributions are computationally indistinguishable. By the transitivity
of computational indistinguisability, after we show the above, we are done.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉 ≈c VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(1) : Follows from the ZK property of definition 3.3.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(1) ≈c VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(2) : Follows from performing a cutoff on the ZK
simulator’s running time (the full technical reasoning can be seen as part of the proof of Claim
4.2), together with the hiding of the commitment algorithm Com(·).
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(2) ≈c VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(3) : Follows from the input privacy (encryption
security) property of the SFE encryption.
• VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(3) ≡ VIEWA∗〈A
∗(ρ),B〉(4) : These two distributions in fact yield exactly the
same distribution, because in both cases the random coins of B in step 6 distribute exactly like Uk.
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